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ABSTRACT 
Following multilateral and regional trade agreements, import tariffs on agricultural and food 
products have been declining globally. Meanwhile, the proliferation of non-tariff measures 
(NTMs), including Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures and Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBTs), has been triggering trade concerns and protracted trade disputes, and efforts to 
harmonize these measures. Most standard-like NTMs allegedly protect human and animal 
health, and the environment from foreign threats. The rising public awareness of food safety 
and/or consumption externalities drives the emergence of these measures. Protectionist 
motives may also ride on this emergence and lead to unnecessary impediments in 
international trade. Delineating the complex impacts of these standard-like NTMs on trade 
and welfare is central to inform market participation by various stake-holders, as well as for 
sound policy design. My dissertation contributes new knowledge to the understanding of the 
impacts of NTMs in agricultural and food markets. Further, the three essays in the 
dissertation have an additional common thread. They focus on the gravity equation approach 
to trade, the workhorse used in the analysis and quantification of the effects of NTMs and 
other trade costs. 
The first essay examines whether the harmonization and tightening of European 
Union (EU) regulations of aflatoxin maximum residue limits (MRLs) have impeded African 
groundnut exports. Using the state-of-the-art gravity equation approach, I revisit early ex-
ante findings of a World Bank investigation predicting a dire adverse effect of the then 
forthcoming harmonization and tightening on African exports of groundnuts. I find that these 
African exports are constrained by their own domestic supply limitations, but that the actual 
harmonization and tightening of EU’s aflatoxin MRLs have had no significant impact on 
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these groundnut exports. The essay stresses the importance of addressing Africa’s under-
trading issue from a development perspective, focusing on domestic supply constraints 
before the border rather than on the excessive stringency of EU MRLs. 
My second essay is a methodological contribution. I provide a parsimonious way to 
disentangle the role of SPS and technical measures as quality signals to consumers and as 
trade impediments through cost increases to producers and exporters. Unlike tariffs which 
always penalize consumers of the taxed commodities, SPS and technical measures can also 
enhance consumers’ demand for the targeted products via quality signaling and by resolving 
informational asymmetries. The proposed methodology identifies the two effects separately 
and sheds light on how consumers and producers respond to these regulations. I apply the 
methodology to an empirical analysis of agricultural trade between OECD countries in 2004. 
I find that in aggregate, intra-OECD agricultural trade was actually facilitated by these 
technical measures rather than impeded, although both effects are clearly present. The 
application adds a new dimension to the continuing debate of “standards as catalysts” versus 
“standards as barriers” in the sense that both effects take place simultaneously and can be 
identified. 
The third essay is an econometric contribution. It proposes a novel two-step estimator 
for the gravity equation model to trade that deals with two stylized features in trade data: 
prevalent zeros trade records and heteroskedasticity. I first conduct Monte-Carlo simulations 
to investigate how the proposed estimator performs relative to other well-known econometric 
techniques. In an analysis of world trade data in 1986, I further demonstrate the usefulness of 
the proposed estimator by providing a model selection strategy using specification tests. The 
results suggest that the proposed estimator dominates alternative estimators in presence of 
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selection bias in data. The essay highlights how crucial the choice of estimator is in the 
quantification of the impact of trade barriers and trade costs on the decision to trade and the 
volume of trade.
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
With the previous and ongoing multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and a slew of regional agreements, there has been a world-wide decline in import 
tariffs (Aksoy and Beghin, 2005). In agricultural and food sectors, tariff liberalization has 
deepened since the enactment of the Agriculture Agreement of the WTO (WTO, 1995a). 
Meanwhile, the proliferation of standard-like Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs), including 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs), has 
raised concerns about their potential protectionism, especially in the North-South context 
(WTO, 1995b; WTO, 1995c). Because stringent NTMs could reduce or even offset gains 
from tariff liberalizations, sorting out the potential impact of these NTMs on trade and 
welfare is paramount to provide information to market participants affected by these 
measures, and to better guide policy design (WTO, 2005). In this dissertation, I provide three 
self-contained yet inter-related essays to guide the quantification of the impacts of standard-
like NTMs and the relevant conceptual framework and econometric methodology required to 
assess these effects. 
The gravity equation model has been widely used in the international trade literature 
to evaluate various trade-related policies. It explains the bilateral trade flow by the sizes of 
the trading countries and other variables that affect the costs of trading between the two 
countries (e.g., distance, import tariffs, colonial tie, adjacency, etc.). A natural extension of 
the gravity equation model to the policy analysis of the NTMs is to include the NTM variable 
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of interest as an additional explanatory variable.1 Unlike tariffs which impede international 
trade and in most instances decrease welfare, standard-like NTMs have more ambiguous 
effects on trade and welfare because they may alter consumers’ quality perception for the 
targeted products besides raising producers’ costs. Further, market imperfections may dictate 
corrective measures (such as country-of-origin labeling and additives prohibitions) to which 
consumers and producers react differently. Such interaction calls for the identification of the 
supply-shifting effect and the demand-shifting effect in the analysis of standard-like NTMs. 
Last, in terms of econometric modeling, recent developments in the gravity equation 
approach highlight the challenges in the statistical estimation of a gravity equation model. On 
one hand, the frequent presence of zeros in trade data requires a proper strategy to deal with 
the potential sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). On the other hand, heteroskedasticity in 
trade data often causes severe bias in the estimation of a logarithmically transformed gravity 
equation (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). These empirical challenges call for the development a 
new estimator for the gravity equation model that can simultaneously deal with both 
problems. This is the motivational context of my dissertation.  
In the first essay, I evaluate the impact of European Union (EU)’s harmonization and 
strengthening of aflatoxin Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) on groundnut exports from 
Africa to EU markets. The World Bank predicted that the harmonization to tighter limits, 
with the associated MRLs below the international standards in Codex, would reduce Africa’ 
groundnut exports by nearly 36% (Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh, 2001). However, by 
                                                 
1 The political economy of the NTMs is beyond the scope of the dissertation. In general, the political economy 
of NTMs is more complex than that of tariffs because: (a) both public’s rising awareness of sanitary threats and 
traditional protectionism effort are in play; (b) the relevant science is incomplete or the opinions on available 
scientific evidence are divided; and (c) the vagueness in notification and implementation of NTMs provides 
further room for political objectives. Interested readers are refereed to the World Trade Report (WTO, 
forthcoming) for a detailed discussion.   
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extending the original dataset to cover both the pre- and post-harmonization periods and 
employing advanced econometric techniques, I find that Africa’s groundnut exports are more 
constrained by their domestic supply issues, rather than by EU’s MRLs on aflatoxin residues. 
The result casts doubt on the conventional wisdom of “standards as barriers” and stresses the 
need to address African domestic supply constraints before the border. In addition to the 
policy findings, the essay provides an appropriate strategy to select the most suitable 
estimator among those readily available for the gravity equation estimation. The essay has 
been published in the European Review of Agricultural Economics. 
My second essay proposes a conceptual framework and methodology to disentangle 
the demand-enhancing effect and the trade-cost effect of technical measures. Not only a 
technical measure increases producers’ costs, it may also affect consumers’ quality 
perception of the regulated commodities. Consequently, the overall effect of a technical 
measure on trade can be either negative or positive, depending on whether the trade-cost 
effect dominates or falls short of the demand-enhancing effect. Such analytical ambiguity is 
also supported by the empirical studies in the literature where mixed results are found: the 
impact of NTMs on trade can range from negative and statistically significant to positive and 
statistically significant (e.g., Jaffee and Masakure, 2005; Disdier et al., 2008; Anders and 
Caswell 2009). A proper disentanglement strategy is much in need to help distinguish a NTM 
addressing market imperfection affecting consumers from one predominately ridden by trade 
protectionism. I apply the proposed disentangling approach in an analysis of intra-OECD 
agricultural trade using data of Disdier et al. (2008). I find that technical measures boost 
consumers’ demand more than they increase foreign exporters’ costs, with a moderate 
positive net effect on the extensive margin of trade. The identification of the demand-
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enhancing effect of these NTMs tends to reject the conjecture that NTMs are purely 
protectionist in disguise. 
In the last essay, I develop a two-step estimator for the gravity equation model that 
accommodates two stylized features of trade data: numerous zero observations and 
heteroskedasticity. Earlier efforts in the literature focus on either side of issue, without a 
consensus on how to deal with the two features simultaneously. The development of a solid 
estimator for the gravity equation model can better guide empirical investigations and lead to 
improved policy recommendations. My proposed two-step estimator works as follows. In the 
first step, zero trade records are explained by a selection process and the extensive margin of 
trade, i.e., the creation of new trade partnership, can be computed accordingly. In the second 
step, an augmented gravity equation with correction for the sample selection bias is estimated 
by a nonlinear least square procedure. Consequently, the intensive margin of trade, i.e., the 
expansion of pre-existing trade flows, is consistently derived even when trade data exhibit 
heteroskedasticity.  
I first conduct Monte-Carlo experiments to investigate how the proposed estimator 
performs relative to other well-known econometric techniques such as the Poisson Pseudo 
Maximum Likelihood estimator (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), the Heckman Sample Selection 
model (Heckman, 1979), and the E.T.-Tobit model (Eaton and Tamura, 1994). In an analysis 
of world trade data in 1986, I further demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed estimator by 
providing a model selection strategy using specification tests. The results suggest that that the 
proposed estimator dominates the alternative methods when the data exhibit non-random 
sample selection and heteroskedasticity in levels. The essay highlights how crucial the choice 
  
5
of estimator is in the quantification of the impact of trade barriers and trade costs on the 
decision to trade and the volume of trade. 
 In the rest of the dissertation, I present the three essays in Chapter 2, 3, and 4 
respectively.  
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
To sum up, my three essays contribute to the knowledge of the impact of NTMs on 
international agricultural and food trade and develop new methodologies for the estimation of 
the gravity equation approach to trade. In the first essay, I find that Africa’s groundnut 
exports are more restricted by their domestic issues, than by European Union’s sanitary 
standards in aflatoxins. The results call for resolving the Africa’ under-trading phenomenon 
(i.e., African countries export less to the world market than projected) from an international 
development perspective, such as improving the storage facilities and upgrading farming 
practices (IFPRI, 2012).  
 My second essay provides a method to disentangle the role of SPS/TBT measures as 
quality signals enhancing demand versus as trade impediments. The empirical application 
suggests that the intra-OECD agricultural trade was overall facilitated by technical 
regulations. The results point to the complexity of the impact of NTMs relative to traditional 
tariff schemes. Furthermore, the methodology in the essay serves as a first step to fully 
distinguish the NTMs with legitimate objectiveness from ones ridden by protectionism. An 
extension of this essay with full-fledged welfare analysis is in my post-dissertation research 
agenda. 
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 A novel estimator is proposed in my last essay for the gravity equation approach to 
trade. The novel estimator successfully deals with two stylized features of trade data: 
heteroskedasticity and prevalent zero observations. This last essay contributes to the 
empirical trade literature by providing strong guidance for the appropriate selection of an 
estimation method in the quantification of the impacts of NTMs and other trade-related 
policies within the gravity equation framework. 
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CHAPTER 2. DOES EUROPEAN AFLATOXIN REGULATION HURT 
GROUNDNUT EXPORTERS FROM AFRICA? 
 
A paper forthcoming in European Review of Agricultural Economics 
Bo Xiong, John Beghin 
Abstract 
We provide an ex-post econometric examination of the harmonisation and tightening of the 
EU Maximum Residues Limit (MRL) on aflatoxins in 2002, and its impact on African 
exports of groundnut products. We find no evidence of the EU MRL having a significant 
negative trade impact on these groundnut exports from Africa across various methods of 
estimation. African domestic supply plays an important role in the determination of the 
volumes of trade and the propensity to trade. Our findings suggest that the trade potential of 
African groundnut exporters is more constrained by domestic supply issues rather than by 
limited market access. 
Introduction 
Aflatoxins are toxic metabolites produced by fungi in agricultural commodities. They are 
commonly found in corn, peanuts, coconuts, cassava and their processed forms. Aflatoxin 
B1, M1, and G1 can cause various types of cancer in both animal species and humans. 
Evidence of acute aflatoxicosis in humans has been reported from many parts of the world 
with grim morbidity and mortality. Chronic intake of aflatoxin in animals can lead to poor 
food intake and weight loss. 
Aflatoxin regulations have received great attention in food policy design and debates. 
Good practice based on current scientific knowledge and technical improvements can reduce 
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the level of contamination; however, the entire elimination of aflatoxins in foodstuffs is 
impossible. Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) are commonly adopted as the policy 
instrument to control for aflatoxin contamination in the food supply. Tight aflatoxin MRLs 
generate health benefits but also induce various costs such as regulatory and administrative 
costs, compliance costs borne by producers, and plausible forgone trade revenues borne by 
some foreign exporters failing the MRLs.  
The EU harmonization of MRLs on aflatoxins in 2002 has highlighted these 
controversial tradeoffs. Prior to 2002, EU member countries set their MRLs individually 
(FAO, 1995). In April 2002, the EU formally adopted a unified MRL policy on aflatoxin 
contaminants (European Communities, 2001 and 2002). In December 2006, the EU modified 
the harmonized maximum levels for certain contaminants in foodstuffs, but the policy 
regarding aflatoxin remained (European Communities, 2006). The harmonized EU aflatoxin 
standards have been more stringent than international standards of Codex Alimentarius of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Health Organization (WHO). First, the 
EU policy targets specific aflatoxin compounds. Not only the EU policy sets an MRL for the 
total aflatoxin level as Codex does, it also imposes an MRL on aflatoxin B1, which is the 
most toxic compound in the aflatoxin family. Second, the EU MRLs are lower than Codex. 
For instance, the EU harmonized MRLs on Aflatoxin B1 for edible groundnuts and shelled 
groundnuts are 2 ppb and 8 ppb respectively, compared to an estimate of 10 ppb for both 
products in Codex Alimentarius.2 Within Europe, the harmonization has different 
implications for different groundnut products: the harmonization process forced many EU 
                                                 
2 Codex Alimentarius sets a MRL of 15 ppb on total aflatoxin contaminants for edible groundnuts and shelled 
groundnuts. 70 per cent of total aflatoxins can be attributed to Aflatoxin B1. Therefore, the Codex MRL on 
Aflatoxin B1 is approximately 10 ppb for both products. 
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member countries to tighten their MRL for edible groundnuts but relax their MRL on shelled 
nuts significantly, except in Portugal, where both MRLs was much stricter than before. 
MRLs for oil were not subject to harmonization, but Switzerland, which follows EU 
regulation, relaxed its MRL on oil in 2002. 
The strictness of the EU standards has triggered concerns that the EU has abused the 
Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and created a protectionist SPS regulation. Groundnut exporters from Africa, in 
particular, are considered vulnerable to the new regulations because of their high cost of 
compliance and their dependency on the EU market as their largest export destination. 
Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh (2001), in a noted paper, examined this very issue in the 
late 1990s by conducting a gravity equation analysis to a pre-harmonization dataset of EU 
MRLs and trade flows. They found that the African exports of edible groundnuts and 
groundnut oil were constrained by the MRL on aflatoxin set by EU member countries during 
1989-1998. Their simulation predicted that the harmonization and tightening of the standards 
in 2002 would decrease African exports enormously. Their analysis has two limitations. The 
first one is the lack of time-variation of the MRL variable. The research was done before the 
harmonization took place in 2002. During the period of examination, 1989-1998, the only 
available data source for the MRL policies on aflatoxin was FAO (1995) reporting 1995 
MRLs. Consequently, the 1995 MRL was assumed to hold for the entire time period and only 
exhibited cross-sectional variation. As we will elaborate later, this lack of time-variation of 
the MRL variable makes its effect undistinguishable from the country-level ‘multilateral 
resistance’ terms or fixed effects (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003).  
The second limitation in Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001) comes from their 
  
11
deletion of the zero trade records. Statistically, the elimination of zeros could result in the 
standard sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). Even if the sample selection issue does not 
bias the estimate of interest, the ignorance of zero trade flows limits the economic 
interpretations of the model. First, the deletion of the zero trade precludes exploring the 
extensive margin of trade, that is, the creation of new bilateral trade partnership, and the role 
of MRL on this margin. In addition, all their estimates are conditioned on trade already 
taking place, and marginal effects of SPS measures and other trade costs are on the intensive 
margin of trade. Nothing could be said on implications for new trade. 
The harmonized EU aflatoxin regulations have been in place for several years and 
remain a plausible factor contributing to the vulnerability of African groundnut export 
potential and market access. It is of much interest to reconsider the previous analysis and re-
examine whether groundnut exporters from Africa actually turn out to be impeded by the 
new EU standards. This issue remains a major concern with development practitioners. For 
example, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has several field projects 
exploring the impact of aflatoxin MRLs on small African holders and how to overcome 
phytosanitary issues in production and trade (IFPRI, 2009). Our investigation complements 
this current fieldwork on aflatoxin and associated trade impediments. 
Our analysis also contributes to the debate on Africa’s ‘under-trading’ (Bouët, Mishra 
and Roy, 2008). Africa trades less with the rest of the world than one would expect, 
according to various economic models, even after controlling for major trade costs and the 
size of the trading economies. It remains a puzzle whether this African missing trade is more 
associated with the limited access to the world market or to domestic factors within Africa. 
Bouët, Mishra and Roy (2008) incorporate various trade barriers in a gravity equation 
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analysis and find that African countries in general already have good market access, and that 
the transport and communication infrastructure can be held accountable for the under-trading 
phenomenon. Other authors have emphasized the poor internal infrastructure of African 
countries (Buys, Deichmann, and Wheeler, 2010).  
Our objective is to provide an ex-post econometric examination of the harmonization 
and tightening of EU MRLs on aflatoxins in 2002, and its impact on African exports of 
groundnut products. By virtue of a state-of-the-art gravity model with corrections for the 
sample selection bias, the ‘multilateral resistance’ terms, and the heterogeneity across firms, 
we have two main findings. First, EU MRLs have no significant impact on groundnut exports 
from Africa across all preferred methods of estimation. Two rationalizations can help 
interpret this result. Either, the MRL regulations are non binding for African groundnut 
exporters because other factors in production and before the border are binding impediments. 
As discussed below, our second result favors this rationalization. Or, alternatively, the tighter 
MRL on aflatoxin does induce additional trade costs to African groundnut exporters, but it 
also generates trade benefits because EU consumers value safer groundnut products from 
Africa. The two effects could systematically offset each other, thus the net effect on trade is 
negligible. 
The second finding is that domestic supply conditions in Africa play an important 
role in the determination of both the trade volumes and the propensity to trade in groundnut 
products. This result is consistent with the recent findings of Bouët, Mishra, and Roy (2008) 
on the lack of trade facilitation in Sub-Saharan Africa for all exports, and the extent to which 
the missing trade is self-inflicted. Rios and Jaffee (2008) and Jaffee and Henson (2004) state 
that in several cases, inspections reveal extreme violations of MRL regulations by African 
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exports, including violations of codex MRLs making the EU MRLs redundant. Consistent 
with the latter, our findings cast doubt on the conventional wisdom of restrictive EU 
aflatoxin regulations. They suggest the key importance of addressing domestic issues in 
production and trade facilitation in Africa. In terms of groundnut products, improving the 
farm-level practice could reduce the aflatoxin contaminants, increase yields, and eventually 
lead to more trade. These improvements would lead to more consistent production of 
exportable products which could meet the MRLs.  
The analysis is organized into five sections. Section 2 outlines our empirical strategy 
and describes the data set. Section 3 provides several model specifications and proposes a 
model selection strategy. Section 4 reports the associated results from the preferred models. 
Section 5 checks the robustness of the main results, and summarizes the trade effects of the 
MRL policy. Section 6 concludes the presentation.  
Methodology and Empirical Strategy 
Gravity equation models are widely used to infer trade flow effects of distance (Disdier and 
Head, 2008), common borders (McCallum, 1995), tariffs (Baier and Bergstrand, 2001), 
technical barriers to trade (TBTs) (Maskus and Wilson, 2001), fixed trade cost between 
countries (Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008), and other trade costs. The gravity 
equation approach posits that bilateral trade volume is a function of the importer’s demand, 
the exporter’s supply, and various bilateral trade costs such as tariffs, technical barriers, 
transportation costs, border effects, colonial ties, etc. Gravity equations fit the data well 
across a wide range of applications in international trade and are a popular tool. Despite this 
popularity, recent research has investigated several widespread mistakes and biases present in 
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gravity equation applications (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Baldwin and Taglioni, 
2006; Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008; and Martin and Pham, 2008).  
Structural shortcomings have been emphasized by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
and Baldwin and Taglioni (2006).  Well specified models should lead to ‘multilateral 
resistance’ terms which are often omitted in gravity equation specifications. When included, 
these effects are often captured by importer and exporter fixed effects. Further literature 
sheds light on several econometric problems associated with the gravity equation that are 
relevant to our analysis. The first problem is the sample selection bias, as originally defined 
by Heckman (1979). A commonly found feature in bilateral trade data is that zero trade 
records are frequent across country-pairs and products, and that the zero trade flows could 
dominate when disaggregated trade data are used. Martin and Pham (2008) show that failure 
in modeling such limited dependency of the trade data can result in large biases for all 
estimates of interest. Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) attribute the absence of trade 
to exporting firms’ self-selection behavior when they exhibit heterogeneous productivity. 
Only the most productive firms export leading to an extensive margin from new firms 
entering export markets. The estimation of their generalized gravity equation model does not 
require firm level data and is implemented via a two-stage modified Heckman procedure.  
Heteroscedasticity is the second econometric problem associated with gravity 
equation models. Because of the Jensen’s Inequality, the parameters of a log-linearized 
gravity equation can not be interpreted as the true elasticities (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). 
Silva and Tenreyro estimate the gravity equation in its original multiplicative form in levels 
using a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML thereafter) method. Martin and Pham 
(2008) compare different estimators in a Monte-Carlo experiment in which both prevalence 
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of zero trade and heteroskedasticity are present. Their results show that the Heckman 
Maximum Likelihood estimator performs well if true identifying restrictions are available, 
and that PPML solves the heteroskedasticity problem but yields biased estimates when zero 
trade observations are frequent. In an application to the exports of US corn seeds, Jayasinghe, 
Beghin and Moschini (2010) find that PPML does not accommodate pervasive zeros well.  
Burger, Van Oort, and Linders (2009) suggest that some variants of the PPML 
estimator accommodate greater dispersion of the data than implied by the Poisson 
distribution and the presence of numerous zero observations using a ‘zero inflation equation.’ 
These variants are the Negative Binomial Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator (NBPML 
thereafter), the Zero-Inflated Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood model (ZIPPML 
thereafter), and the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Pseudo Maximum Likelihood model 
(ZINBPML thereafter). These models often outperform PPML in empirical trade applications 
with frequent zero trade flows.  
To address the co-existence of the pervasive zero trade flows and the 
heteroskedasticity issue, the selection of a preferred estimator is guided by empirical results. 
We consider Truncated Sample Ordinary Least Square (a reference benchmark), the 
Helpman-Melitz-Rubinstein (HMR) generalized gravity equation model, and the pseudo 
maximum likelihood estimators (PPML, NBPML, ZIPPML, and ZINBPML), followed by a 
model selection strategy. Inferences are then drawn upon the econometric results to select the 
preferred models. Next we describe the data and then move into the model specification and 
selection. 
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Data Description 
Our dataset builds upon the dataset of Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001) considering 
edible groundnuts, groundnut oil, and shelled groundnut (groundnut for further processing). 
Bilateral trade volumes of each groundnut product between 14 European countries (13 EU 
members: Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, plus Switzerland3), and nine African countries (Chad, 
Egypt, Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, Senegal, South Africa, and Zimbabwe) are extracted 
from United Nations COMTRADE for the period 1989-2006.4 For MRL levels, we use 
FAO’s survey of worldwide regulations for mycotoxins in food and feed (FAO, 1995), and 
Commission Regulation No 466/2001 on setting maximum levels for certain contaminants in 
foodstuffs (European Commission, 2001). With these two sources, we construct an MRL 
variable that indicates the MRLs on aflatoxin B1 imposed by each EU member country in 
each year.5  
The income argument in any EU member country’s demand for groundnut exports is 
represented by its GDP expressed in local currency units from the World Development 
Indicators of The World Bank for any given year. The annual domestic supply of a groundnut 
product in a given African country is proxied by its total exports to the rest of the world of 
that product.6 To deal with the potential endogeneity associated this proxy, we also extract 
                                                 
3 We refer to all 14 importers of interest as EU member countries or the EU hereafter including Switzerland 
which has aflatoxin MRLs similar to the EU MRLs but is not a member of the EU.  
4 SITC Revision 1 codes 05172, 2211 and 4214 are used as the product categories for edible groundnut, shelled 
groundnut and groundnut oil. 
5 We follow Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001) and assume that the MRLs reported in FAO (1995) hold for 
the period 1989-2001. The harmonized MRLs cover the period 2002-2006. For Switzerland, the MRLs after 
2001 follow FAO (2004). 
6 Consumption data in Africa is not systematically available. Consumption is often made of nontraded lower 
quality. We assume that domestic consumption takes a negligible share in the supply of the higher quality 
exportables. 
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food supply series from FAOSTAT database for robustness’ check. Our dataset also contains 
a distance variable measuring the capital distances between country pairs, a colonial tie 
dummy indicating whether trading partners had colonial relationship in history as described 
in Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001), and a common language dummy that equals one if a 
language is spoken by at least 9 per cent of the population in both countries.7 
Three features of our dataset are outstanding. First of all, zeros dominate the trade 
records in all three groundnut products. 88 per cent of the bilateral trade flows in edible 
groundnut between African countries and the EU are zeros. This percentage is 90 per cent for 
groundnut oil and 81 per cent for shelled groundnut. Some of these zero trade observations 
may be due to rounding errors or incompleteness of the COMTRADE, but many others are 
more likely to reflect African exporters’ reluctance or inability to trade. The latter could 
result from prohibitive fixed cost to establish trade partnership with the EU member 
countries, including compliance costs to meet the restrictive standards. Therefore, it is 
necessary to explicitly model this limited-dependency of the trade data to accommodate the 
absence of trade. Second, the MRL variable exhibits time variation due to the EU 
harmonization of aflatoxin regulations in 2002, which allows us to disentangle the trade 
effect of the MRL policy out of the country-level fixed effects. Lastly, our supply proxy 
originates in the sectoral approach of the gravity equation and it is a supply measure in 
physical quantity rather than the GDP of the exporter.8 We express the supply in physical 
form (metric tons) as we deal with disaggregated commodities. 
                                                 
7 Tariffs could matter. TRAINS data show that EU tariffs faced by African countries are mostly zero from 1995 
on. Pre-1995 tariff are not in TRAINS. TARIC has some pre-1995 information. The available data exhibits little 
variation across the importers and over time. We capture the effect of tariffs with time fixed effects. 
8 Henry de Frahan and Vancauteren (2006) provide a brief discussion of the sectoral gravity equation 
application to disaggregated trade data. 
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Model Specifications and Model Selection 
We consider three estimation alternatives for the gravity equation model. The first one is the 
Truncated Sample Ordinary Least Square (Trun-OLS hereafter), which is commonly used in 
the literature. It is an Ordinary Least Square estimator applied to the subsample of positive 
observations.9 The Trun-OLS estimator suffers from several criticisms. One major statistical 
problem is the potential sample selection bias it can cause if the eliminated zero observations 
are not drawn on a random basis. This is potentially our case since countries choose 
voluntarily not to trade with each other. Even if a sample selection bias is not detected, the 
economic interpretations of truncated OLS estimates are limited. In our application, a Trun-
OLS estimate only captures the intensive margin to trade, the intensification of existing trade. 
However, from a development viewpoint it is the creation of new bilateral trade partnerships 
(the extensive margin) that we are interested in. Have the harmonization and tightening of the 
EU aflatoxin regulation decreased the international market accessibility for groundnut 
exporters from Africa? The latter concern naturally motivates a Heckman-type sample 
selection model. 
We choose the HMR approach which is the state-of-the-art of the gravity equation 
approach to trade with sample selection. The HMR approach generates an extended gravity 
equation model with firm-level heterogeneity in productivity with three positive features. 
First, it explains zero trade flows. The absence of bilateral trade occurs when all producers, 
even the most efficient ones, within a country find it unprofitable to export to a destination. 
Second, HMR addresses the sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). A selection equation 
                                                 
9 We use the Trun-OLS model to test the endogeneity of the MRL variable using the one-year-lagged MRL as 
the instrument. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the MRL variable is 
exogenous to trade. 
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accounts for the qualitative choice of outcomes, whether or not to trade with an EU country 
in our context.  This selection equation and the outcome equations (the equation with positive 
observations only) are jointly estimated via a maximum likelihood method or a two-step 
procedure.  
Third, HMR controls for the trade effect of the fraction of exporting firms, which 
varies across exporting countries due to the different degrees of firm-level heterogeneity. 
Only the most productive firms export because exports entail some additional fixed costs 
relative to selling domestically. Econometrically, this additional term in the outcome 
equation can be consistently estimated from the first stage of the Heckman two-stage 
procedure. To help with the identification, one explanatory variable included in the selection 
equation is excluded from the outcome equation. Economic theory suggests that a variable 
that affects the fixed costs of EU-African trade, but not the variable costs of trade, would 
qualify. We let the colony dummy variable serve this role.10 The HMR in our application is 
specified as follows: 
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The definition of each variable is presented in Table 1. 
                                                 
10 The colony dummy is empirically preferable to the common language dummy as the excluded variable 
because it stands out significant in the selection equation in two out of the three products, while the common 
language has null explanatory power on any selection equations (see Table 3). The common language variable 
also leads to convergence problems in HMR when used as the excluded variable. 
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Table 1. Definitions of variables 
Variable name Definition 
k
ijtY  The quantity traded of groundnut product k from African country i to 
EU member country j in year t 
k
jtMRL  The MRL applied to groundnut product k set by EU member country 
j in year t 
jtGDP  The GDP (in local currency unit) of EU member country j in year t 
k
itSupply  The total supply of groundnut product k in African country i in year t 
ijDist  The distance between African country i and EU member country j 
ijDlang  The common language dummy variable for African country i and EU 
member country j 
ijDcol  The colonial tie dummy variable for African country i and EU 
member country j 
tYear  The dummy variable for year t 
mDex  The national dummy for African country m
a, c 
nDim  The national dummy for EU member country n
b, c 
Note: a. South Africa is the reference country among the exporters whose national dummy is suppressed.  
b. France is the reference country among importers whose national dummy is suppressed. c. Although time-    
varying national fixed effects are more desirable, the inclusion of time-varying importers’ fixed effects would 
be perfectly collinear with the MRL variable and fully absorb its effects. 
 
Selection equation (1) is essentially a standard Probit binary choice model, where 
)(•Φ  is the standard normal distribution function. We assume that the colonial tie dummy 
variable affects the fixed cost of trade, but has negligible effects on the variable costs to 
trade. Variables βs, αs, γs, and ηs are parameters to be estimated. A positive β1 suggests that 
the MRL on aflatoxin constrains trade. In Equation (2), the term }1)]ˆ(ln{exp[ −+ kijtkijtk IMRzδ  
captures the trade effect of the fraction of firms in country i that export to country j in year 
t.11 Specifically, 0>kδ  is a parameter to be estimated: a larger kδ  corresponds to a greater 
degree of heterogeneity in productivity across firms in sector k, with more unproductive 
firms and fewer productive ones. kijtzˆ  is the linear prediction calculated from estimates of (1). 
                                                 
11 Readers are referred to Equation (14) in HMR for its derivation. 
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The inverse Mill’s ratio, kijtIMR , computed from the estimates in (1) as well, controls for the 
standard sample selection errors as in Heckman (1979). We follow HMR to consistently 
estimate the model through a two-step procedure.12 In the first step, (1) is estimated via 
Maximum Likelihood method, and the predicted probability to trade kijtzˆ  and Inverse Mill’s 
Ratios kijtIMR  can be computed accordingly. In the second step, (2) is estimated via Non-
Linear Least Squares. 
Another concern with the gravity equation approach is the inherent heteroskedasticity 
in the trade data combined with the log-linearization of the original multiplicative form of the 
gravity equation leading to biases in elasticity estimates. To address this concern, we follow 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Burger, Van Oort, and Linders (2009) to re-estimate the 
gravity equation in levels via the pseudo maximum likelihood estimators. The PPML 
estimator proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) has been shown to be robust to various 
heteroskedastic patterns as long as the conditional variance of the dependent variable is 
proportional to its conditional mean. However, this condition can be violated when the data 
exhibits excessive zero outcomes. The excessive zeros can either result from the over-
dispersion of the data generating process, or the existence of another data generating process 
that produces inflated zeros (Greene, 1994). In order to accommodate those excessive zeros 
and identify their underlying processes, variants of PPML such as NBPML, ZIPPML, and 
ZINBPML are used and statistical tests lead to selecting a preferred variant. All four pseudo 
maximum likelihood estimators numerically allow for zero observations.  
The specification of the PPML model is as follows: 
                                                 
12 Though desirable to estimate the model via a joint Maximum Likelihood method for efficiency consideration, 
the non-linearity of the outcome equation makes the log-likelihood function intractable. 
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where kijtX is the matrix containing all explanatory variables under consideration. The 
consistency of the PPML estimator is insured assuming )|()|( kijt
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conditional mean of the NBPML model is also based on (3), but allowing for over-
dispersion, )|()|( 2 kijt
k
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ijt XYEXYVar ∞ . 
 The zero-inflated variants, ZIPPML and ZINBPML, are specified in the following 
way: 
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where )( kkijtx γΦ is the probability of zero trade flows due to exporters’ decision to be absent 
from the export market, )(•f  is the density function of the data generating process that 
produces the levels of trade flows conditioning on the decision to trade. With the ZIPPML 
method, the data generating process has a mean of (3), and )|()|( kijt
k
ijt
k
ijt
k
ijt XYEXYVar ∞ . In 
ZINBPML, the data generating process has the same mean, but )|()|( 2 kijt
k
ijt
k
ijt
k
ijt XYEXYVar ∞ . 
Notably, there are two sources of zero trade flows in the zero-inflated models. Either, an 
exporter decides not to trade in the first stage, or it decides to trade but is hit by a negative 
cost shock which makes the trade volumes zero. As in the HMR model and for consistency 
across selection and inflation equations, we assume that the colonial tie between countries 
tends to affect the decision to trade, but not the conditional trade volumes.  
To sum up, we consider all four pseudo maximum likelihood estimators, with 
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associated tests to select the proper model. First, the difference between PPML and ZIPPML 
(as well as for NBPML and ZINBPML) hinges on the existence of another data generating 
process that produces excessive zeros caused by self-selection into no trade. A Vuong test 
(Vuong, 1989) is used to distinguish the zero-inflated model and its regular counterpart. 
Second, ZIPPML is a special case of ZINBPML when over-dispersion is not established in 
the data generating process of the trade levels. Statistically, the existence of over-dispersion 
is tested using a standard likelihood-ratio test (with the null hypothesis that the dependent 
variable exhibits equi-dispersion). NBPML nests PPML as a special case in a similar way. 
Now we propose a model selection strategy via which we can compare above-mentioned 
models based on both economic theory and the relevant statistical tests. Table 2 summarizes 
the features of each model and suggests a roadmap for selection. We choose the most 
preferable model via the elimination of the dominated models. 
Table 2. Model selection for all three groundnut products 
Model Trun-
OLS 
HMR Pseudo maximum likelihood estimators 
   PPML NBPML ZIPPML ZINBPM
L 
Model features 
Selection/inflation 
process 
no yes no no yes yes 
Correction for 
selection bias 
no yes no no no no 
Trade effect of 
new entrants 
no yes no no no no 
Robustness to 
heteroskedasticity 
no no yes no no no 
Tests on the family of pseudo maximum likelihood estimators 
Dispersion test - - PPML≺NBPML ZIPPML≺ZINBPM
L 
PPML≺ZIPPML - Vuong test - - 
- NBPML≺ZINBPML 
  Notes: More details on the statistical tests are presented in Table 5. 
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First of all, the Truncated OLS model is considered inferior to others because of its 
inability to address zeros and new market access, its potential biasness from sample 
selection, and vulnerability to heteroskedasticity. Secondly, the dispersion and Vuong tests 
lead to the ZINBPML model as the most suited model within the family of pseudo maximum 
likelihood estimators for all three groundnut products. Therefore, the model choice boils 
down to the comparison between the HMR model and the ZINBPML model. As Table 2 
shows, the HMR model has the advantages of correcting for the potential sample selection 
bias, that is, the information one can infer about the trade volume once we know an exporter 
decides to export to a destination; and modeling the trade effect of newly entrants to the 
export market in a theoretically rigorous and econometrically applicable way. However, the 
ZINBPML model is able to accommodate both the decision to trade and the over-dispersion 
of trade, commonly found in disaggregated data. In fact, there are no existing statistical 
methods to distinguish the two models methodologically, suggesting that the choice between 
HMR and ZINBPML is case specific.  Since we find evidence of the mis-specification of 
firms’ margins and biasness due to logarithmic transformation (see Table 4 below), one could 
consider ZINBPML to be preferable to HMR. 
Model Results and Discussions 
The HMR results are reported in Table 3.13 We discuss the estimates in the selection 
equations and the outcome equations, in turn. Two interesting findings come from the 
estimated selection equation. First, the decision of trade or not is indeed an endogenous 
outcome as we expect. The estimates in the selection equations show that a larger European 
                                                 
13 We also estimate the model via standard Heckman Maximum Likelihood method without controlling for the 
firm-level heterogeneity. The estimates, with new firms margins absent, are qualitatively similar to those in 
Table 3. 
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GDP, a more abundant supply, or a historical colonial tie helps create new trade partnership 
between the African groundnut exporters and the European importers. Second, the MRL 
policy on aflatoxin has very little impact on the extensive margin to trade. In other words, the 
MRL policy on aflatoxin imposed by the EU does not appear to decrease market access for 
African exporters. 
The estimates in the outcome equations convey two important messages. First, the 
MRL imposed by the EU has negligible effects on either existing exporters or newly entered 
exporters from Africa, which contradicts the previous finding by Otsuki, Wilson, and 
Sewadeh (2001).14 The P-values associated with the MRL estimates suggest that the policy is 
not statistically significant at 10 per cent level for any groundnut product under 
consideration. Second, among all other bilateral trade determinants, African domestic supply 
is the only systematic contributor to exporting all three products, suggesting the key 
importance of domestic production capacity in Africa to explain its trade potential. 
Table 3. Helpman-Melitz-Rubinstein models 
 Edible groundnut Shelled groundnut Groundnut oil 
  Exten. 
margina 
Existing 
firms’ 
marginb 
New 
firms’ 
marginc 
Exten. 
margina 
Existing 
firms’ 
marginb 
New 
firms’ 
marginc 
Exten. 
margina 
Existing 
firms’ 
marginb 
New 
firms’ 
marginc 
MRL -0.165 
(0.280) 
-0.408 
(0.271) 
-0.123 
(0.263) 
-0.030 
(0.807) 
0.031 
(0.926) 
-0.013 
(0.836) 
0.759 
(0.234) 
1.006 
(0.497) 
0.287 
(0.271) 
GDP 1.156♦ 
(0.001) 
-7.150♦ 
(0.001) 
0.825♦ 
(0.001) 
0.820 
(0.177) 
0.089 
(0.963) 
0.398 
(0.139) 
1.602♦ 
(0.000) 
-4.007 
(0.311) 
0.645♦ 
(0.000) 
Supply 0.073** 
(0.035) 
0.441♦ 
(0.001) 
0.053** 
(0.029) 
0.363♦ 
(0.000) 
0.276 
(0.123) 
0.164♦ 
(0.000) 
0.272♦ 
(0.000) 
0.836* 
(0.076) 
0.105♦ 
(0.000) 
Dist 1.268♦ 
(0.002) 
-0.395 
(0.841) 
0.903♦ 
(0.003) 
0.699** 
(0.012) 
-1.403 
(0.291) 
0.320** 
(0.013) 
-1.634♦ 
(0.009) 
-
7.372** 
(0.046) 
-0.649♦ 
(0.004) 
Dlang -0.264 
(0.345) 
1.082 
(0.279) 
-0.200 
(0.330) 
0.122 
(0.520) 
-1.399♦ 
(0.002) 
0.043 
(0.594) 
-0.046 
(0.855) 
0.360 
(0.301) 
-0.028 
(0.778) 
 
                                                 
14 To detect the possible long-run effect of MRLs, we also add a new variable, MRL interacting with a linear 
time trend, and re-estimate the model. The estimate of the new variable is insignificant across all three products. 
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Table 3. (continued) 
 Edible groundnut Shelled groundnut Groundnut oil 
  Exten. 
margina 
Existing 
firms’ 
marginb 
New 
firms’ 
marginc 
Exten. 
margina 
Existing 
firms’ 
marginb 
New 
firms’ 
marginc 
Exten. 
margina 
Existing 
firms’ 
marginb 
New 
firms’ 
marginc 
Dcold 0.913♦ 
(0.005) 
 0.678♦ 
(0.004) 
1.202♦ 
(0.000) 
 0.544♦ 
(0.000) 
0.288 
(0.321) 
 0.127 
(0.277) 
IMRe 0.764 
(0.456) 
0.136 
(0.821) 
0.590 
(0.757) 
Obs.      1736 287 2156 462 1470 231 
Notes:  a. The extensive margin is defined as the derivative of the logarithmic-scaled probability of trade with respect to the exogenous 
variable of interest. (see Appendix in supplementary data at ERAE online for details).  b. The existing firms’ margin corresponds to the 
estimate in (2), the second step of HMR. (see Appendix in supplementary data at ERAE online for details).  c. The new firms’ margin is 
defined as the derivative of the non-linear term in (2), the second step of HMR, with respect to the exogenous variable of interest. (see 
Appendix in supplementary data at ERAE online for details). The associated P values are based on bootstrapped standard errors. d. Dcol 
is excluded from the outcome equations for the identification purpose.  e. The Inverse Mill’s Ratio, computed from the estimates in the 
first-stage selection equations, corrects for the sample selection bias in the outcome equations. P-values are in parenthesis. *, **, and ♦ 
denote 10, 5, and 1 per cent significance level, respectively. 
 
Two alternative rationalizations can help interpret the null effect of the EU MRLs. 
Either, most African exporters have difficulty meeting standards either before or after the 
harmonization, while a few well-established firms are able to comply with new regulations at 
little additional costs. Therefore, the change in MRLs only affects a handful of marginal 
firms. Or, the potential trade loss of African groundnut exporters due to the compliance cost 
associated with the tighter standard is offset by the trade benefits originated from an 
enhanced EU demand given consumers’ preferences for safer groundnut products.15  
We now turn to the effects of other trade cost terms. A larger European income 
appears to encourage trade in edible groundnuts, with incumbent firms being crowded out to 
some extent; whereas income does not seem to influence the trade in shelled groundnut much 
but tend to promote the propensity to trade groundnut oil. The importer fixed effects may 
also account for some of the income variation across EU countries. A longer distance 
decreases the sales of currently exporting firms for all three products but its effects on the 
                                                 
15 The evolution of retail prices could help distinguish the two rationalizations. Unfortunately, the retail price 
series of African groundnut products sold in EU markets are not currently available. 
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two other margins in edible groundnuts and shelled groundnuts are unexpected. A colonial tie 
in history promotes the creation of new trade and is statistically significant for two out of the 
three products, which in part confirms its qualification as the excluded variable. The role of 
the common language is insignificant across margins and products expect that it has a 
significantly negative effect on the incumbents in the sector of shelled groundnuts, which is 
also unexpected. 
The sample selection term, represented by the Inverse Mill’s Ratio, turns out not 
statistically significant for all three groundnut products. The findings on the new firms’ 
margins exhibit three notable features. First of all, some trade cost terms do affect trade flows 
through altering the behavior of new entrants, as evidenced by several significant new firms’ 
margins in Table 3. This result underscores the importance of controlling for the new firms’ 
margins. Secondly, a trade cost term can have very different impact on the incumbents versus 
new entrants. For example, the EU income response for edible groundnuts and groundnut oil 
from Africa suggests they are probably inferior products (negative income response in the 
existing firms’ margin), although new trade of these products, both at the country-level 
(extensive margins) and at the firm-level (new firms’ margin), is more likely to occur with 
large EU countries. Lastly, the existing firms’ margin does not always dominate the new 
firms’ margin. Although the existing firms’ margin is larger in magnitude for most variables 
in Table 3, the income effects in the sector of groundnut oil indicate that sometimes newly 
entered firms are more sensitive to certain market conditions than incumbents. 
Although firmly grounded in economic theory, the HMR model suffers from two 
major critiques. The logarithmic transformation of the trade flows in the outcome equation 
could lead to biased estimates of the elasticities. The logarithmic transformation often leads 
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to correlation between the error terms and exogenous variables, thus to biased elasticity 
estimates in the outcome equations (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The Ramsey specification 
test (Ramsey, 1969) can be used to detect whether the outcome equations are correctly 
specified. The other concern, raised by Silva and Tenreyro (2009), is that the non-linear term 
capturing the trade effects of new firms is mis-specified if the selection equation in HMR 
exhibits heteroskedasticity. Therefore, a heteroskedasticity test on the first-stage Probit 
models should be used for diagnostic purpose. We report the two tests in Table 4. The 
Ramsey test results show that the elasticity estimates in the outcome equation for groundnut 
oil could be biased severely due to the logarithmic transformation. The homoskedasticity 
tests suggest that the decision to trade exhibits a great degree of heteroskedasticity in all three 
products, implying that the non-linear term in the second-stage of the HMR model is mis-
specified.   
 Table 4. Tests on the HMR models 
 Edible  
groundnut 
Shelled 
groundnut 
Groundnut  
oil 
Ramsey test on outcome 
equations 
F-stat P value F-stat P value F-stat P value 
H0: no specification error. a 0.02 0.899 1.48 0.224 3.91 0.049 
       
Heteroskedasticity test on 
selection equations 
2χ -stat P value 2χ -stat P value 2χ -stat P value 
H0: homoskedasticity. b 33.36 0.000 11.50 0.001 19.81 0.000 
Notes: a. Following Silva and Tenreyro (2006), the squared fitted value is used as the additional regressor in 
the auxiliary regression of the test. The significance of this additional regressor suggests the mis-specification 
of the model. b. The alternative hypothesis is that the variance of the selection equations is proportional to the 
magnitude of African supply. H0 is rejected if African supply significantly explains the variance. 
  
Now we turn to the ZINBPML model, which is preferred model among the Pseudo 
Maximum Likelihood estimators based on the relevant statistical tests. Table 5 reports the 
ZINBPML model results for all three products, along with the Vuong tests and dispersion 
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tests.16 The likelihood ratio tests of the possible over-dispersion indicate that trade flows in 
all three products are significantly over-dispersed, whether or not a different process is in 
place to account for the decision to trade. Therefore, PPML and ZIPPML are dominated by 
NBPML and ZINBPML respectively. The additional Vuong tests show that PPML and 
NBPML are inferior to their zero-inflated variants ZIPPML and ZINBPML, implying that a 
binary choice process is indeed necessary to account for exporters’ self-selection to not trade. 
Table 5. ZINBPML models 
 Edible groundnuts Shelled groundnuts Groundnut oil 
Model Extensive 
margina 
Intensive 
marginb 
Extensive 
margina 
Intensive 
marginb 
Extensive 
margina 
Intensive 
marginb 
MRL -0.504 
(0.271) 
-0.697* 
(0.075) 
-0.139 
(0.639) 
0.248 
(0.346) 
2.090 
(0.175) 
1.034 
(0.208) 
GDP 4.613♦ 
(0.000) 
-5.743♦ 
(0.000) 
2.279 
(0.107) 
1.088 
(0.355) 
4.352♦ 
(0.000) 
-1.335 
(0.515) 
Supply -0.216* 
(0.066) 
0.447** 
(0.035) 
0.694♦ 
(0.000) 
0.653♦ 
(0.000) 
0.739♦ 
(0.000) 
0.737♦ 
(0.000) 
Dist -3.186** 
(0.032) 
4.684♦ 
(0.004) 
1.988♦ 
(0.004) 
-1.452 
(0.566) 
-4.440♦ 
(0.004) 
-6.768♦ 
(0.000) 
Dcol 1.057 
(0.237) 
 2.463♦ 
(0.000) 
 0.744 
(0.283) 
 
dlang -0.323 
(0.730) 
0.472 
(0.636) 
0.952** 
(0.016) 
-1.121♦ 
(0.000) 
-0.133 
(0.844) 
0.422** 
(0.016) 
Dispersion     3.292♦ 
(0.000) 
    2.090♦ 
(0.000) 
    0.702♦ 
(0.000) 
Vuong 
Statisticc 
(P value) 
 7.15♦ 
(0.000) 
  8.97♦ 
(0.000) 
  7.09♦ 
(0.000) 
Notes: a. The extensive margin is defined as the derivative of the logarithm-scaled probability of trade with 
respect to the variable of interest. (see Appendix in supplementary data at ERAE online for details). The 
associated P values are based on bootstrapped standard errors. b. The intensive margin is defined as the 
elasticity of trade levels with respect to the variable of interest, corresponding to raw coefficients in the 
outcome equations. (see Appendix in supplementary data at ERAE online for details). P-values are in 
parenthesis. *, **, and ♦ denote 10, 5, and 1 per cent significance level, respectively. 
 
As shown in Table 5, the MRL shows no significant impact on either trade volume or 
                                                 
16 The Vuong test is a likelihood ratio test. The associated statistic is normally distributed, with a large positive 
value in favor of the ZIPPML (ZINBPML) model and a large negative value in favor of the PPML (NBPML) 
model. See Vuong (1989: 318). 
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the propensity to trade for all three groundnut products, except that it exhibits a moderate 
volume-promoting effect for edible groundnuts. This finding is consistent with the HMR 
results. A larger European income increases Africa’s propensity to export edible groundnuts 
and groundnut oil but decreases the trade volume of edible groundnuts, indicating the inferior 
good attribute of African edible groundnuts as in the HMR approach. A more abundant 
African supply enhances the intensive margins for all groundnut products, and promotes 
trade in edible groundnuts and groundnut oil on the extensive margins.  The effect of distance 
ranges from positive and statistically significant to negative and statistically significant, 
which is unexpected in a gravity equation analysis and hard to rationalize. The lower bound 
of the distance effect, -6.8 in terms of elasticity, is close to the lower bound reported in 
Hummels (2001). 
A common language has a controversial negative effect on shelled groundnuts: 
However, this controversy is reconciled if the interest is in the role of common language on 
the total trade value in all three products: the Africa-EU trade value in the sector of 
groundnut oil is nearly five times larger than the sector of shelled groundnuts on average, so 
the net effect of common language on the total trade value remains positive. The variable 
may confound the change in the trade composition and the trade facilitating aspects of a 
common language. 
Next, we summarize the estimated trade effects of the MRL set by the EU. Although 
the ZINBPML model is slightly preferred over the HMR model based on the model 
diagnostics, we make use of the results in both models to summarize the trade effects of EU 
MRLs on African groundnut exports, which are shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6. The impact of the EU MRL on groundnut exports from Africa 
 Edible 
groundnut 
Shelled 
groundnut 
Groundnut  
oil 
Extensive margin -0.165 -0.030 0.759 
Existing firms’ margin -0.408 0.031 1.006 
HMR 
New firms’ margin -0.123 -0.013 0.287 
Extensive margin -0.504 -0.139 2.090 ZINBPM
L Intensive margin -0.697* 0.248 1.034 
   Note: * denotes 10 per cent significance level. 
 
Table 6 shows that the trade effects of EU MRLs on African groundnut exports are 
insignificant among the two preferred models and across three groundnut products, with one 
exception where the MRL seems to have promoted African exports of edible groundnuts. 
With this estimated elasticity of -0.697, we further simulate how much would the average 
trade level be for 2002-2006 if the EU harmonization in MRLs didn’t occur. The result 
shows that Africa’s export revenue in the sector edible groundnuts would be lower by USD 
224,800 if the pre-harmonized MRL policies remained. In contrast to the standards-as-
barriers argument for the EU’s regulations on aflatoxins, our findings suggest that the effect 
of the EU’s MRL policy on groundnut product trade is null or at best ambiguous, and 
certainly not impeding. Neither the propensity to create new trade partnership nor the volume 
exported to the previously penetrated destinations is found to be significantly influenced by 
the MRL in most cases.  
The positive distance effects obtained in some of the HMR and ZINBPML results 
were unexpected. This counter-intuitive effect suggests that geographic distance might not be 
a good proxy for the transportation cost in Africa-EU groundnut trade. We investigated 
alternative specifications with interaction terms with other transaction cost variables. The 
problem was attenuated but did not disappear. Other variable costs such as the distance by 
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sea and/or infrastructure facilities should be considered in further research.  
In addition, we conduct several robustness checks. We address the potential 
endogeneity of the African supply variable, which is constructed as each African country’s 
total exports to the rest of the world. The simultaneity of trade and output determination is a 
common problem in the applied trade literature. Several fixes have been recommended. 
Harrigan (1994) suggests using factor endowments as the instrumental variables for the 
output, and estimate the model by two-stage Least Squares. However, our application is so 
disaggregated that it would be difficult to find a valid factor endowment instrument. Another 
remedy is simply to constrain the coefficient of the supply to be one, or in other words let the 
share of exports be the dependent variable. The disadvantage of this fix is that we would not 
able to infer how important the domestic capacity is to the export potential of Africa. The 
approach we take to address the endogeneity is to construct an alternative African supply 
proxy from the FAOSTAT database. The database provides food supply series for a wide 
range of agricultural commodities and countries. For each of the nine African countries, we 
extract ‘groundnut oil,’ ‘groundnuts (in shell equivalence),’ and ‘groundnuts (shelled 
equivalence)’ as the alternative supply series for groundnut oil, shelled groundnuts, and 
edible groundnuts respectively. This alternative African supply is considered exogenous to 
the bilateral trade flows. As a first-pass, we use the FAOSTAT supply proxy as an 
instrumental variable and find that the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test fails to reject the exogeneity 
of the total export in the trun-OLS results. In addition, we replace total export with this 
alternative and re-estimate all of the models.17 The ZINBPML model remains the most 
preferable one among four pseudo maximum likelihood estimators. Within the two preferred 
                                                 
17 The associated results are available from authors upon request. 
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models, HMR and ZINBPML,18 all trade effects of MRLs are insignificant except for one 
from ZINBPML, suggesting MRL marginally decrease Africa’s propensity to export 
groundnut oil, with a significance level of 10 per cent.  
Conclusion 
As traditional trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas have been declining over time, there 
has been a concurrent upward trend in the adoption of various food safety standards. Food 
safety standards are driven by human health and/or environmental concerns, and generally 
grounded in the risk assessment of specific contaminants in food and feed. Since 1961, the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission jointly formed by FAO and WHO has been promoting 
international food safety standards that can serve as ‘an international reference point.’ 
However, many countries have not adopted these non-binding international standards, but 
rather have set food safety standards for a wider range of commodities and at a much tighter 
level than what Codex recommends, which consequently brings the possibility of a 
protectionist motive. This motive does not directly exist in the EU for groundnuts because 
they are not produced in the EU. 
Our study investigates the 2002 EU’s harmonization and tightening of the MRL on 
aflatoxin contaminants and its impact on groundnut product exports from Africa. We use a 
state-of-the-art toolkit for gravity equation approaches to investigate the trade effects of these 
EU’s MRL policies on African groundnut exporters. The contribution of our analysis to the 
literature is triple. First of all, unlike previous econometric analyses of EU aflatoxin policies, 
our results suggest that the harmonization and tightening of aflatoxin regulations within the 
                                                 
18 For the sector of groundnut oil, the second step of the HMR model suffers from convergence problems. 
Hence, the impact of MRLs on the trade volumes of groundnut oil is inferred from the ZINBPML model only.  
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EU has no significant effect on African groundnut exports, either in terms of the trade 
volumes, or the propensity to trade. This empirical result challenges the established view that 
a stricter food safety standard would act like a barrier to trade. 
Our preferred rationalization of this lack of significant effect of the MRL policy is 
that the EU food safety policy is non binding for African groundnut exporters because their 
export potential is mostly constrained by their domestic capacity, such as farming and storage 
practice, and/or other trade costs before the border as strongly suggested by our second 
finding. We find that domestic groundnut supply conditions in Africa appear to be a binding 
constraint for its groundnut exports across all methods of estimation. This finding implies 
that it is the domestic issue rather than the accessibility to the EU market that constrains 
Africa’s export potential. Addressing Africa’s under-trading problem from a development 
viewpoint might be more helpful than merely improving international accessibility for 
African traders (Bouët, Mishra, and Roy, 2008; Rios and Jaffee, 2008). Last, our application 
sheds light on the performance of different estimation strategies for the gravity equation 
model, especially in the context of numerous zero observations. 
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Appendix 
Margins in the HMR model 
In general, the selection equation determining firms’ self-selection to export is specified as 
).()0Pr( γXY Φ=>  
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The outcome equation generating the trade levels conditional on trade taking place is 
specified as 
,}1)](ln{exp[)0|(ln IMRIMRzxYYE
k
kk ηδβ +−++=> ∑  
where 0>δ  is a function of the shape parameter in the Pareto distribution governing firms’ 
productivity, the constant elasticity of substitution, and the estimated variance in the selection 
equation;19 γˆ⋅′= xz  is the linear prediction in the selection equation; )()( zzIMR Φ=φ  is 
the Inverse Mill’s Ratio as in Heckman (1979). The second term on the right hand side 
captures the trade effect of newly entered firms; and the third term on the right hand side 
corrects for the sample selection bias. Because we find no evidence of significant sample 
selection errors across all three products (see Table 3), we assume 0=η thereafter. 
Applying the rules of conditional expectations, we have 
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Taking the logarithm of the above equation, and then taking the derivative with respect to an 
exogenous variable, kx  for instance, we have 
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The above equation states that the overall marginal effect can be decomposed into an 
intensive margin 
kx
YYE
∂
>∂ )0|(ln , that is, the intensification of existing trade flows, and an 
extensive margin 
kx
Y
∂
>∂ )0Pr(ln , that is, the creation of new trade. Note that the extensive 
margin can be readily computed from the estimates in the selection equations. 
 
As Hoffman and Kassouf (2005) shows, 
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>∂ )0|(ln)0|(ln  holds under some 
regular conditions.20 Therefore, the intensive margin can be computed as  
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where )5.0exp(
2
)( 2zzz −−=′ πφ  is the derivative of the standard normal density function. 
The above equation states that the intensive margin can be further decomposed into the 
existing firms’ margin and the new firms’ margin. 
 
                                                 
19 Readers are referred to Equation (13) in HMR (2008) for the definition of δ . 
20 Readers are referred to Appendix B of Hoffman and Kassouf (2005) for a detailed exploration of the 
conditions. 
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Margins in the ZINBPML model 
In general, the inflation equation is specified as 
).()Pr( δXNoTrade Φ=  
The outcome equation is specified as 
).exp()|( ∑=
k
kkxTradeYE ψ 21 
Applying the rules of conditional expectations, we have 
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Taking the logarithm to the above equation, and then taking the derivative with respect to an 
exogenous variable, kx for instance, we have 
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Replacing )Pr(Trade  with 1- )Pr(NoTrade , we have 
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In the above equation, the first term on the right hand side, kψˆ , is the intensive margin; the 
second term on the right hand side captures the extensive margin.
                                                 
21 Compared to the outcome equation in the HMR model, the outcome equation in the ZINBPML permits zero 
trade flows. 
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CHAPTER 3. DISENTANGLING THE DEAMND-ENHANCING EFFECT AND THE 
TRADE-COST EFFECT OF TECHINCAL MEASURES IN AGRICULTURAL 
TRADE AMONG OECD COUNTRIES 
 
Abstract 
Domestic technical measures such as SPS and TBTs can enhance import demand via 
information disclosure and quality improvement, or hamper foreign export supply via 
imposing sizeable compliance costs, or both. The traditional gravity equation model 
estimates the net effect of these measures on international trade with a loss of useful 
inference on separate effects. We stipulate a generalized gravity equation model to 
disentangle the two effects. We apply the augmented approach to agricultural trade among 
OECD countries in 2004. We find that technical measures in agriculture often jointly 
enhance import demand and hinder export supply with the net effect of promoting the 
propensity to trade. Further disaggregated data analysis reveals heterogeneity across sectors 
in terms of net effects of technical measures, despite common demand-enhancing and 
supply-hindering effects. These measures in the net decrease the probability of intra-OECD 
trade in dairy products, whereas they increase that of intra-OECD trade in cereal 
preparations. 
Introduction 
The Agreements on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures and 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) took effect in 
1995. They allow WTO member countries to apply SPS and TBT measures to protect domestic 
human health, animal and plant health, and the environment. However, concerns that these 
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measures create trade frictions and serve protectionist motives have been brought up 
frequently. For instance, the Philippines, in a complaint to the WTO in 2002, claimed that 
Australia’s SPS measures on fresh fruit and vegetables had hurt its exporters unnecessarily. In 
2010, Indonesia filed a WTO dispute against the United States (DS406) for imposing 
restrictions on cigarette additives thus affecting the production and sale of Indonesian clove 
cigarettes.  In general, the implications of technical measures22 on market access and welfare 
are more complex than traditional tax-based trade barriers measures, such as tariffs and 
countervailing duties, primarily because they often address market imperfections (asymmetric 
information, externalities). They tend to affect consumers’ information set and behavior as well 
as producers’ behavior.  Thus they cannot be easily translated into a simple tax or price 
equivalent. Their welfare effects are fundamentally different as well. The presumption that the 
removal of technical measures is welfare-improving is not grounded in any economic theory, 
unlike for the removal of a trade tax by a small country. 
From the perspective of exporters, the additional cost of complying with a stringent 
standard abroad could be high. Those compliance costs may include the fixed costs of 
upgrading the equipments and/or practice codes, gaining certificates, altering marketing 
strategies, etc. In addition, inspection procedures at custom points add to the variable cost of 
exporting. As a result, the compliance costs could significantly decrease export volumes, and 
drive small exporting firms out of a foreign market. This is the trade-cost effect, or the supply-
inhibiting effect of technical measures, which corresponds to the conventional “standards as 
barriers” argument in the international development literature on market access (Otsuki, 
                                                 
22 Throughout the article, we use technical measures, SPS measures, and quality standards interchangeably. 
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Wilson, and Sewadeh, 2001a). 
On the other hand, a technical measure may enhance the demand for imports if the 
measure is informative (Thilmany and Barrett, 1997). In the latter case, the measure signals a 
higher quality of the permitted imports via information disclosure such as trade marks, labeling 
requirements, and detailed description of certain attributes or restricting toxic residues. The 
quality improvement enhances consumers’ demand for imports, as well as contributes to 
consumers’ long-run health benefits (Marette and Beghin, 2010). This is the demand-
enhancing effect, or the quality improvement effect of technical measures, corresponding to the 
“standards as catalyst” argument in the SPS/TBT debate. (The “standards as catalyst” 
argument also includes the claim that stringent foreign standards could trigger exporters to 
upgrade their supply chain, to access higher quality markets opportunities in the long-run, 
e.g., Jaffee and Henson, 2005). Therefore, a technical measure can affect trade volumes and/or 
the propensity to trade in either direction: a tighter standard promotes trade if its demand-
enhancing effect dominates its trade-cost effect; it impedes trade if its demand-enhancing effect 
falls short of the trade cost effect.  The analytical ambiguity of the impact of technical 
measures on international trade calls for a more careful empirical quantification and 
identification of the trade effects of these measures, a task we pursue in this investigation.  
Gravity equation models are widely used to estimate bilateral trade flows and their 
determinants such as the attributes of trading countries (such as GDP, total production) and 
various trade cost terms (such as tariffs, distance, colonial ties, and preferential trade 
agreements), including certain technical measures imposed by the importing countries. The 
existing results accumulated so far on trade effects of technical measures are mixed. The 
estimated net effects of technical measures vary across products, country groups, and to some 
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extent estimation methods with net trade effects spanning from significantly negative to 
significantly positive (Li and Beghin, 2010). For example, Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh 
(2001a) predicted that 2002 EU harmonization of aflatoxin residue standards would reduce 
groundnut exports from Africa. This prediction could not be confirmed by Xiong and Beghin 
(2011) in an ex-post panel analysis. Jaffee and Masakure (2005) report that Kenyan fresh 
vegetable exporters benefited from the proliferation of food safety standards in Europe by 
successfully updating their supply chains. Anders and Caswell (2009) find that Hazard 
Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) reduces American’s seafood imports from large 
exporting countries. Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008) show that agricultural exporters 
from the South are more likely to be hurt by rising TBTs and technical measures than their 
competitors from the OECD countries but that they measure can enhance trade in some 
sectors among OECD partners, while hindering trade or having no net trade effects in other 
sectors. Disentangling the separate impacts of technical measures on import demand and 
export supply would allow a cogent rationalization of these various outcomes. However, 
studies toward the identification of the two effects are rare to date. (As a case study on 
Japanese cut flowers, Yue and Lan (2009) show that estimates of the trade effect of SPS are 
biased when the induced quality changes are not considered). 
We undertake to separately identify these supply and demand effects. This is a useful 
pursuit. First, the disentanglement of consumers’ and producers’ responses to an informative 
standard helps determine if the standard is driven by public awareness or potential 
protectionism. (Fugazza and Maur (2008) demonstrate the importance of modeling both the 
demand and supply-shift effects of technical measures in policy analysis using CGE models). 
In case consumers are found to be insensitive to the quality improvement induced by a higher 
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standard, the new policy should be subject to further scrutiny for possible protectionism. For 
instance, the absence of direct demand-enhancing effect could also be consistent with 
policies addressing long-term deleterious health or environmental effects valued by society 
but overlooked by consumers of the good affected by the technical measure (e.g., Peterson 
and Orden 2008). Second, the disentangled approach provides grounds for better policy 
recommendation both for domestic consumers and development assistance to exporters in the 
South, potentially handicapped by technical measures. For example, the fairly common finding 
of negligible net trade effect of technical measures (e.g., Xiong and Beghin, 2011) may 
dissimulate a potential demand-enhancing effect beneficial to consumers and mostly offset by 
exporters’ inability to comply with the measures. The latter could lead to international 
assistance programs to exporters in the South. 
Moreover, the disentanglement of the effects of SPS measures on consumers and 
producers makes possible the welfare evaluation of a policy change. Disdier and Marette 
(2010) use an analytical framework to link the mercantilist aspects and welfare aspects of 
non-tariff measures and find that although antibiotic residue limits reduce crustaceans imports 
in US, EU, Canada, and Japan, they boost both domestic and international welfare. Therefore, a 
proper disentangling strategy would allow exploring how a change in SPS polices affects 
different agents in international trade. Identifying the two separate effects could also lead to 
better policy design by the social planner, especially in presence of externalities associated with 
trade. An optimum measure can be designed with proper knowledge of its impact on 
consumers. 
We propose an econometric approach to disentangle the demand-enhancing effect and 
the trade-cost effect of any standard and apply the model to examine the impact of technical 
  
45
measures on agricultural trade among OECD countries in 2004. The two effects can be told 
apart based on two simple but essential facts. First, the maximum of the domestic standards 
and the foreign standards affects consumers’ demand for imports: the domestic standards serve 
as the quality signal if the home country adopts stricter regulations than the exporting country; 
the foreign standards serve as the quality signal if higher standards are applied abroad. 
However, the difference in standards between the trading countries influences the trade costs of 
exporting firms: a firm already meeting a stringent regulation in its home market can meet the 
standards in the country of destination easily or at no additional cost. For instance, seafood 
exporters from Canada are arguably better equipped to meet U.S. HACCP regulations than 
seafood exporters from Thailand because HACCP procedures are common in Canada. 
We apply the model to investigate agricultural trade among OECD countries in 2004 
and significantly refine the findings of Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008).  We find that 
technical measures facilitate intra-OECD agricultural trade, for those measures enhance 
consumers’ demand for imports more than they handicap exporters’ supply of exports. In a 
further disaggregated analysis of technical measures imposed on cereal preparations primarily 
targeting mycotoxins, we find that these measures tend to in the net to induce additional intra-
OECD trade in cereal products. In contrast, technical measures affecting dairy products tend to 
decrease the trade among OECD countries in their net effect. Demand enhancing effects are 
found in both of these sectors. 
In what follows, we provide a conceptual model leading to a specification disentangling 
the two effects of technical measures. Then we apply the model to empirically examine the 
impact of technical measures on agricultural trade among OECD countries in 2004. Section 4 
concludes the analysis and discusses possible extensions. 
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The Modeling Approach 
Our analytical framework characterizes the separate impact of technical measures on the 
demand for imports and the supply of exports. In equilibrium, a generalized gravity equation 
model emerges and provides a specification to be estimated which preserves the 
identification of the separate impacts on domestic consumers and foreign exporters. Welfare 
implications are also discussed. 
The Import Demand 
The goods available in the economy are differentiated by sectors and by country of 
origins (Armington, 1969). For example, “Japanese apples” and “New Zealand apples” are two 
distinct goods in the composite sector “apples.” There are S sectors.  There are I  countries 
trading or potentially trading with one another. Country j  has jN identical consumers deriving 
utility from market consumption and long-run health (or the environment). The implementation 
of a standard affects both utility channels. The standard affects individual consumption level 
by conveying a quality signal to consumers. In addition, there might be certain long-run 
health benefits (individual and collective ones) associated with the standard but overlooked 
by individual consumers.  For example, standards restricting antibiotic use in food provide 
quality enhancements perceived by consumers and collective health benefits from reduced 
antibiotic resistance likely to be external considerations for many individuals (Beghin and 
Marette, 2009; Disdier and Marette, 2010). Similar external environmental effects are often 
linked to the volume of trade, such as invasions by exotic pests. 
To accommodate the above features, we use the Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
(CES) preferences to characterize consumers’ utility derived with market consumption and we 
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assume that the health or environmental benefit is additively separable from the market 
consumption utility. Specifically, the representative consumer in country j  solves the 
following optimization problem: 
(1a)    ∑∑∑∑ −= −−
i s
sijsij
s i
sijsijjq
QqU
sij
)(])([max 1
1 δκδ ε
ε
ε
ε
  
(1b)    ∑∑ =
s i
jsijsij yqPts .. ,  
where sijδ  is the quality preference parameter of the representative consumer in country j  
for good s  produced by country i ; sijq  is the consumer’s quantity demanded for good s  
produced by the country i ; )(⋅κ  is a decreasing function mapping the quality of the good to 
the per-unit hazard associated with the import; sijQ , exogenous to individual consumers, is 
country j ’s aggregate demand for good s  sourced in country i ;ε  is the constant elasticity of 
substitution; sijP  is the price of good s  produced in country i  and sold in country j ; jy  is the 
per-capital income in country j. Solving the representative consumer’s problem (1) yields the 
following individual demand: 
(2)       j
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P
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,                                                                                                           
where ∑ ∑ −−=Π s i sijsijj P εεδ 11 is the consumer price index in country j . Note that the long-run 
health benefit doesn’t affect the solution at all since the external effect is assumed separable for 
tractability. Country j ’ aggregate demand for good s  produced by the country i , in value 
terms,  is then 
  
48
(3)        j
j
sijsij
jj
j
sijsijd
sijjsij
d
sijsij
d
sij Y
P
Ny
P
qNPQPV Π=Π=⋅⋅=⋅≡
−−−− εεεε δδ 1111
,                                 
where jY  is country j ’s national income. Note that the above import demand is positively 
related to the income level and the consumers’ quality evaluation of the good, but negatively 
related to the price of the good as long as 1>ε .  
The information disclosed by the technical measures, among many factors, can alter 
consumers’ quality evaluation of the concerned good. We parameterize sijδ  as  
(4)        }),,max{exp(0 sjsissij SPSSPSβδδ =                                                                         
where 0sδ  is consumers’ preference for good s  in absence of technical regulations;23 β , is a 
non-negative parameter to be estimated that captures the degree to which consumers respond 
to the technical information disclosure; siSPS  and sjSPS  are the stringency of technical 
measures imposed on sector s  in country i  and j . Hence, the term }),max{exp( sjsi SPSSPSβ  
characterizes the demand-enhancing effect, or the quality improvement effect of technical 
measures. Notably, Equation (4) assumes full compliance of all firms: a firm must meet its 
domestic standards in the first place, and it has to improve the quality of its exports to meet the 
foreign standards if selling to a destination where stricter standards apply. In the latter case, 
consumers in the destination country care about the higher domestic quality signal. However, if 
a foreign firm has a quality exceeding the importing country’s quality requirement, then 
consumers in the latter country react to the stricter quality requirements adopted by the 
                                                 
23 All other factors affecting consumers’ quality perception or evaluation are subsumed in 0sδ . 
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exporting country.24 
The Export Supply 
We assume a representative producer for each sector in each country. The products 
sold by this representative producer at different destinations are imperfect substitutes because 
the producer has to further modify the products to meet the local quality requirements in each 
destination country (re-packaging, re-labeling, etc). For example, U.S. apples to be sold in 
Japan are not exactly the same as U.S apples consumed domestically (Calvin, Krissoff, and 
Foster 2008). We further assume the representative producer of good s  in country i  is 
endowed with a production capacity siQ  and a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) 
technology (Geraci and Prewo 1982; Bergstrand 1985). The CET technology allows the 
exporter to transform products prepared for different destinations. The problem for the 
representative producer is to decide which countries to export to and how much to export to 
each foreign market. Let siΩ  be the set of destinations the representative producer of good s  
in country i decides to serve.25 The producer solves the following problem 
(5a)      ∑
Ω∈Ω∈ sisijsij j
sijsijQ
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max                                                                                                
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where 0<η  is the CET between exports prepared for different destinations (a largeη  in 
                                                 
24 Consumers are assumed to be cognizant of both domestic and foreign quality signals implied by the 
measures. This is consistent with a label stating that quality exceeds the standard in the destination market. 
25 For the purpose of tractability, we do not explicitly model the endogenous choice of siΩ . However, in the 
empirical part, we partially account for countries’ decision to export or not by using the Heckman sample selection 
model. Interested readers are referred to Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) for a detailed characterization of 
firms’ exporting behavior. 
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absolute value corresponds to easy transformation); sijτ >1 is the “iceberg melting” trade cost 
term: sijτ  units of good s  have be to shipped out of country i  in order for one unit to arrive in 
country j . The solution to (5) yields the following export supply functions in value terms: 
(6)        ,1
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sij sijsijsi
P  is the producer price index for sector s  in country 
i reflecting the cost of exporting to all possible destinations. Equation (6) suggests that the 
supply of exports is positively related to the production capacity of the exporting country and 
the price of the goods, but negatively related to trade cost terms. 
With the empirical investigation in mind, and as standard practice in gravity equation 
models, we parameterize sijτ  as 
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where sijtar is the bilateral tariff rates in sector s ;  ijdist  is the distance between country i  
and j ; sjNTB represents the protectionist non tariff barrier (other than technical measures) 
imposed in sector s  by country j ;26 ijBord  is a common border dummy variable that equals 
one if the trading partners share a common border; ijCol  is a colonial dummy variable that 
equals one if the two countries had a colonial relationship in history; γ , db , bb , cb , all 
presumably positive, are parameters to be estimated.  
                                                 
26 These protectionist non-tariff barriers differ from the technical measures or SPS measures in that they do not 
constitute quality signals thus presumably impede trade by suppressing the supply of exports. See further 
discussion in Section 3. 
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The new source of trade cost in (7) is }0,max{ sisj SPSSPS − , which characterizes the 
trade cost due to the difference in technical measures between trading countries. The trade 
cost term implies that exporting firms have to overcome additional costs (e.g., expenditure on 
additional equipments to improve quality, further processing, obtaining necessary 
certificates, etc.) if selling to a destination where a stricter standard applies relative to their 
home country’s standard. Czubala, Shepherd, and Wilson (2007) find that the harmonized or 
shared standards are less trade-impeding and sometimes trade-promoting. Our formulation of 
the trade cost effect accommodates such harmonized or shared standards ( sj siSPS SPS= ). For 
instance, intra-EU trade is presumably less impeded or even promoted by EU’s technical 
measures because of their harmonization within the community. 
The Equilibrium 
In equilibrium, the import demand equals the export supply in each sector and for 
each country pair. By imposing the market clear condition, ssij
d
sij VV = , we can solve for the 
equilibrium trade value, sijV , and the equilibrium price, sijP , in sector s  for the exporting 
country i  and the importing country j . Specifically, solving (3) and (6) yields  
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It can be noted from (8a) that the equilibrium price is increasing in the importing country’s 
income level, jY , the quality of the imports, sijδ , and the trade cost between the two countries, 
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sijτ ; but it is decreasing in the exporting country’s total supply capacity, siQ . Equation (8b) 
shows that the bilateral trade flow (in value) is increasing in the importing country’s income 
level, jY , the exporting country’s capacity, siQ , and the quality of the imports, sijδ ; but it is 
decreasing in the trade cost between the two countries, sijτ .  Substituting (4) and (7) into (8b), 
and taking logarithms lead to following characterization of equilibrium bilateral trade flows      
(9)  
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where )()1( ηεηφ −−=  and ( 1)(1 ) ( )θ ε η ε η= − − − . 
Equation (9) forms a generalized gravity equation model in which the demand-
enhancing effect and the trade cost effect of SPS measures are identified separately. The most 
stringent set of standards between exporting and importing countries affects consumers’ 
valuation of the concerned good by signaling the highest quality between the two. On the other 
hand, stringency differentials between the trading partners influence trade costs and export 
supply: a firm already meeting stringent home regulations can meet the standards in the 
destination country at negligible additional cost. The proposed model makes explicit how 
underlying demand and supply components of bilateral trade react to technical measures. 
Meanwhile, the model retains the parsimony and spirit of the gravity equation approach. 
Besides noting the disentangling the two effects of SPS/TBT measures, our 
specification leads to several remarks. First, the inclusion of tariffs as a determinant of trade 
remains essential to identify the model structure as in many gravity applications. Equation (9) 
shows that the trade effects of all other trade costs combine the price effect of tariffs 
(parameterθ ) to their specific impacts on unit cost of each other trade cost as shown in 
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equation (7). Secondly, the estimated trade effects of technical measures may suffer from 
omitted variable bias if the technical measures adopted by the exporting countries are ignored. 
Equation (9) shows that trade flows are independent of the standards applied by the country of 
origin, siSPS , if and only if 0=siSPS , that is, the exporting country has no technical 
measures of its own. Last, the recovered elasticities of substitution in traditional gravity 
equation models analyzing technical measures should be interpreted with caution. The 
elasticity recovered here, ( 1)(1 ) ( )θ ε η ε η= − − − , includes both CES and CET parameters 
and provides information on consumers’ taste patterns, as well as exporters’ ability to 
transform products across destinations. 
At last, we discuss some of the welfare implications of a new standard on good s by 
the importing country, specifically on its consumers’ and foreign exporters’ welfare. To 
characterize the welfare effect for domestic consumers, we substitute (2) and (8a) into (1a) to 
get the indirect utility function for country j as follows: 
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QB . The first term on the right hand side of (10) 
captures in the surplus associated with market consumption, while the second term 
characterizes the consumers’ welfare implications on long-run health or other external effect. 
27 For simplicity sake, we assume for a moment that the new standard adopted by country j  
only affects exporter i . (All other trading partners already have the same or the equivalent 
                                                 
27 We leave out the impact of domestic standards on domestic producers. Presumably, the effect can be either 
positive, if the domestic producers successfully comply with the regulations, or negative, if the associated 
compliance costs turn out significant. 
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standards in place).  The first term in (10) captures the consumer surplus effects. The quality 
improvement associated with the new regulation increases sijδ , which benefits domestic 
consumers and increases their willingness to pay for qsij. On the other hand, trade cost rises 
with the new stringency faced by the exporter; the price of the good increases and welfare is 
reduced. Consequently, the net effect on the consumer surplus from consuming good s is 
presumably ambiguous. Secondly, the negative external effect shown in the second term of 
(10) is reduced via lower morbidity or reduced invasion rates )( sijδκ , although trade 
expansion could exacerbate these external effects. 
The total welfare effect on the consumer is presumably ambiguous and is unlikely to 
be just determined by effect on the volume of trade as often assumed in gravity analyses of 
NTMs. The quantification of the demand-enhancing effect and the impact on potential 
externalities is essential: the more information standards convey to consumers, and/or the 
more scientific evidence underlies the regulations, the weaker the presumption of sheer 
protectionism and welfare losses. 
Country j ’s new regulation affects foreign exporters’ profits. By assumption, exporters 
from country i  face additional cost to continue selling in country j . By substituting (6) and 
(8a) into (5a), we derive the following profit function for the representative exporter i in sector 
s : 
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It can be noted from (11) that the profit is increasing in the perceived quality of the 
imports, sijδ , in country j but decreasing in the trade costs, sijτ to meet the new standard.  
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Hence, the importing country’s new regulation has two direct offsetting effects on the profit of 
foreign exporters (higher willingness to pay in the importing country but higher trade cost to 
sell there). The relative size of these effects determines the direct impact of the new standard 
on profits. 28 
In summary, from the above discussion of equations (10) and (11), it is clear that 
technical measures and their stringency have complicate welfare implications requiring the 
disentanglement of their separate effects on import demand and export supply as also 
emphasized by Disdier and Marette (2010), and Beghin et al. (2011). 
An Empirical Application 
In this section, we apply the proposed model to examine the impact of technical measures on 
agricultural and food trade among OECD member countries using data for the year 2004. 
The data come from Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008) and COMTRADE. As in 
Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008), we run a regression based on pooled data for all 
sectors and then separate regressions based on sectoral data with a detailed investigation of 
trade in dairy and cereal preparations. The dataset is rich but unfortunately is a pure cross-
section without time variation. This constraint means that we can only identify the effects of 
variables that are not co-linear in absence of time variation in the data. Accordingly, we re-
write (9) as  
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where jfe  is the fixed effect, or the multilateral resistance term (Anderson and van Wincoop 
                                                 
28 Additionally, the new standard affects exporters’ profitability in other destinations by altering the relative prices 
across foreign markets. We abstract from such indirect trade diversion effect in our discussion. 
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2003) of the importing country j ; sife  is the fixed effect in sector s  in the exporting country 
i . Note that importers’ fixed effects absorb the impact of the price indexes, jΠ  and incomes 
jY , in the importing countries; and that sector-specific exporters’ fixed effects subsume the 
impact of the price indexes, siΨ , and the production capacity, sitQ , in the exporting countries. 
Admittedly, the lack of time variation in the across-sectional analysis prevents us from 
identifying ε  and η  separately but we can still identify the separate shifts resulting from 
demand enhancing effects and export supply cost effects of technical measures affecting 
trade. 
Data and Empirical Strategy 
The data set largely draws upon Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008). Information 
on non tariff measures (NTMs) in 2004 is retrieved from the Trade Analysis Information 
System (TRAINS). Various measures imposed by the importing countries are recorded at 
each HS-6 product level. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), a NTM measure can be sorted into the following seven categories: 
(a) para-tariff measures, (b) price control measures, (c) finance measures, (d) automatic 
licensing measures, (e) quantity control measures, (f) monopolistic measures, and (g) technical 
measures. Among the seven categories, (a) (b) (e) and (f) are protectionist by design as they 
decrease allocative efficiency, so we pool these four categories together and call them 
“protectionist NTBs.” Category (g) contains the technical measures we are interested in. We 
restrict our attention to intra-OECD trade because notifications by non-OECD countries are 
often not up to date and incomplete. One would estimate the impact of notification behavior 
rather than the impact of actually implemented policies if including NTMs notifications by 
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non-OECD countries. 
The intra-OECD agricultural trade and tariff data are collected from the “Base pour 
l’Analyse du Commerce International” (BACI), of Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII), and augmented with COMTRADE-WITS. They are 
aggregated at the HS-4 level. Within each HS-4 category and for each country, a frequency 
index proxy-ing the stringency of technical measures is constructed as the total number of 
“technical measure” notifications within that HS-4 category over the total number of HS-6 
level products within that HS-4 category. For example, New Zealand issued a total of 80 
technical measures (measures applied to different HS-6 products are considered distinct even 
if the requirements are the same) under the HS-4 category “fruits, nuts and other edible parts 
of plants” in 2004. This particular HS-4 category contains 12 HS-6 products. Hence, New 
Zealand’s frequency index of technical measures applied to “fruits, nuts and other edible 
parts of plants” is 6.67. A frequency index representing the intensity of the use of 
protectionist NTBs (other than the technical measures) is constructed in a similar manner. 
Other trade cost terms, including bilateral distance, common border dummy variable, 
common language dummy variable, and colonial tie dummy variable, are sourced from 
CEPII.29 
Our estimation strategy is to rely on the Heckman sample selection model. The 
Heckman sample selection model has three empirical advantages. First of all, it accounts for 
countries’ self-selection to not export by including a selection equation. This selection could 
be caused by the inability to overcome certain fixed costs of trade. Thus, the Heckman 
                                                 
29 Some tariff and trade data are missing in Disdier, Fontagné and Mimouni (2008). We complement the data 
with COMTRADE. Nevertheless, the bilateral tariff series is still incomplete. We drop those observations with 
missing tariffs. As a robustness check, we replace with missing tariffs with the sample averages at importer 
level. The results are qualitatively unchanged.  
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sample selection model is in line with the micro-foundation of gravity equation models as 
proposed by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) and addresses the problem with 
frequent zero outcomes. (Another estimator capable of accommodating zeros numerically is 
the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator advocated by Silva and 
Tenreyro 2006. However, Martin and Pham (2008) show that PPML can lead to biased 
estimates when zeros are frequent). Second, the Heckman sample selection model allows 
exploring both the intensive and the extensive margins to trade. Technical measures can 
either affect exporter’s trade volumes via increasing the variable cost of exporting, or their 
propensity to trade via adding to the fixed cost of trade, or both. It is worthwhile to 
investigate both margins and determine how the technical measures affect the related 
industry. Lastly, the Heckman sample selection model corrects for the sample selection bias 
inherent in traditional Least-Square estimators. Specifically, the Heckman sample selection 
model, based on (12), is  
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where 0>sijV  if and only if 0* >sijV . Equation (13a) is the outcome equation that explains the 
trade volume conditional on trade taking place. If the sample selection bias is present, the 
idiosyncratic term is correlated with covariates in (13a). Equation (13b) is essentially a Probit 
model in which the outcome is one if two countries trade with each other, and zero otherwise. 
We can estimate (13a) and (13b) jointly either via the maximum likelihood approach, 
assuming that the idiosyncratic terms are bivariate normal with correlation ρ , or via a two-
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step procedure.30 For identification purpose, the Heckman sample selection mode often uses 
an exclusion restriction. A variable in the selection equation is excluded from the outcome 
equation. In our context, a variable that affects the fixed cost of trade but not the variable cost 
of trade would qualify. However, it is often difficult to find such a variable. Helpman, Melitz, 
and Rubinstein (2008) use “days and procedures needed to start a business” for this purpose, 
but they also use the common religion dummy variable as an alternative due to the limit data 
on the above-mentioned variable. We choose the common language dummy variable as the 
exclude variable in our application.31 
In the next subsection, we first examine the impact of technical measures on intra-
OECD agricultural trade in general. To this end, we pool different agricultural sectors 
together and fit the Heckman sample selection model (13a)-(13b). We then analyze each 
sector (at HS-2 level) separately to see how different products have been affected by 
technical measure. 
Results Discussion 
The estimation results for the intra-OECD agricultural trade in 2004 are reported in 
table 1. We first discuss the estimates in the outcome equation to see how different factors 
determine the trade volumes conditional on countries trading with one another, and then we 
turn to the estimates in the selection equation to explore what affects the propensity to trade. 
As shown in the second column of table 1, the technical measures adopted by OECD 
countries enhance consumers’ demand for imports significantly, suggesting that the OECD 
                                                 
30 In the next subsection, we report the results from the two-step procedure because the high dimensionality 
makes the convergence of the full likelihood function difficult.   
31 For robustness check, we re-estimate the model with the colonial tie dummy variable excluded. The results 
are barely affected. See the next subsection for detail. 
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technical measures do serve as quality signals to which consumers respond. This finding 
contradicts the claim that pure protectionist motives drive these measures. The trade cost 
effect of OECD technical measures turns out negative and statistically significant, indicating 
that technical measures adversely affect OECD exporters via increasing variable costs of 
exports. To gauge the net effect of technical measures, we test the hypothesis that sum of the 
demand-enhancing effect and the trade-cost effect is zero. The associated F-statistic fails to 
reject the hypothesis, which implies that the volumes of trade between OECD countries are 
not severely affected by technical measures because the two effects almost cancel out. Other 
trade cost terms have the expected signs and magnitudes as typically found in a gravity 
equation analysis. Specifically, tariffs, other NTBs, and geographic distance are found to 
impede trade; countries with a common border or a historical colonial tie tend to trade more.  
The selection equation is shown in the last column of table 1, technical measures as 
quality signals increase the propensity of OECD consumers to purchase agricultural products 
from other OECD countries, as evidenced by a positive and statistically significant demand-
enhancing effect. The trade cost effect, on the other hand, decreases exporter’s propensity to 
export, suggesting that the technical measures significantly add to the fixed costs of export.  
Table 1. Model results for intra-OECD agricultural trade, 2004 
Variable Trade 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Variable Trade 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Quality 
θβ  
0.140*** 
(0.036) 
0.123*** 
(0.010) 
Colony 
cbθ  
0.040 
(0.051) 
0.073** 
(0.024) 
Trade Cost 
θγ−  
-0.166*** 
(0.044) 
-0.099*** 
(0.013) 
Language 
lbθ  
N.A. 0.150*** 
(0.020) 
Tariff 
θ−  
-0.988*** 
(0.086) 
-0.363*** 
(0.026) 
Protectionist 
NTBs  
pbθ  
-0.205*** 
(0.053) 
0.034* 
(0.019) 
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Table 1. (continued) 
Variable Trade 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Variable Trade 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Distance 
dbθ−  
-1.288*** 
(0.033) 
-0.604*** 
(0.009) 
Protectionist 
EU NTBs 
EUpb _θ a 
-0.077 
(0.127) 
0.040 
(0.037) 
Border 
bbθ  
0.911*** 
(0.043) 
0.460*** 
(0.022) 
Inverse 
Mills Ratiob 
0.726*** 
(0.075) 
Note: a. The protectionist NTBs adopted by the EU can have different trade effects than those imposed by 
other OECD countries because intra-EU trade is not subject to EU’s NTBs. To capture this potential 
difference, we allow the response to EU’s NTBs to be different. b. The Inverse Mills Ratio is the additional 
regressor in the trade equation that corrects for the sample selection bias. The significance of the Inverse 
Mills Ratio confirms the suitability of the Heckman sample selection model. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.  
 
 
The above finding has important implications for small exporters, or firms that are 
just productive enough to overcome the fixed cost of trade (Melitz, 2003; Chaney, 2008). 
The proliferation of technical measures places another hurdle for small firms to jump, which 
could drive them out of foreign markets although results show that higher willingness to pay 
is generated by the technical measures.  
In terms of other trade determinants, tariffs and distance are shown to hinder trade; a 
common border, a colonial tie in history, or a common language fosters trade new 
partnership. The protectionist NTBs are shown to be positively correlated with trade 
propensity, which is unexpected given the presumption of real trade impediment.32 The 
significance of the Inverse Mills Ratio confirms the importance of accounting for the 
selection process and the propensity to open new trade. 
To shed more light on the trade effects of technical measures, we compute the 
extensive margins to trade, the intensive margins to trade, and the overall marginal effects (see 
Appendix for the derivation). The extensive margin to trade refers to the changes in the 
                                                 
32 However, the overall marginal effect of protectionist NTBs, with both the extensive margin and the intensive 
margin taken into account, can be shown to impede trade. 
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propensity to trade as its determinants change. In the Heckman sample selection model, the 
extensive margin corresponds to the marginal effect in the selection equation (13b). The 
intensive margin to trade, on the other hand, describes how trade volumes between existing 
trading partners respond to changes in underlying determinants. The intensive margin of a trade 
determinant corresponds to its direct effect, captured by its coefficient in outcome equation 
(13a), as well as its indirect effect through the sample correction term. The overall marginal 
effects can then be calculated as the sums of these two margins. 
Table 2. Marginal effects of technical measures on intra-OECD agricultural trade 
 Intensive margin Extensive margin 
Demand-enhancing effect 0.140*** 
(0.036) 
0.142*** 
(0.012) 
Trade-cost effect -0.166*** 
(0.044) 
-0.113*** 
(0.015) 
P value of 2χ -stat for  
H0: zero net effect 
0.303 0.001 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the extensive and intensive margins of technical measures on 
intra-OECD agricultural trade in 2004. As shown in the first row in table 2, technical 
measures appear to serve as quality signals and enhance OECD consumer’s quantity 
demanded as well as the propensity to import from other OECD countries. The second row in 
table 2 suggests that technical regulations increase both the variable cost and the fixed cost 
faced by OECD exporters. Noticeably, the magnitude of the extensive margin is comparable 
to that of the intensive margin, for either effect. To gauge the net effect on both margins, we 
consider a simple case in which the importing country imposes a new technical measure 
while the exporting country doesn’t. The net effect of this new regulation can be computed as 
the sum of the demand-enhancing effect and the trade-cost effect. As shown in the third row 
in table 2, the net effect is positive but not statistically significant on the intensive margin, 
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which suggests that the bilateral trade volume would be barely affected by the new regulation 
although both supply and demand shift and welfare will be affected. However, the net effect 
is negative and statistically significant on the extensive margin, which indicates that the new 
measure is likely to create new trade partnership among OECD members. In other words, the 
technical measures enhance consumers’ demand for imports more than they handicap 
exporters’ supply of exports. These results substantially refine the previous findings of 
Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008) who found that SPS/TBT measures on agricultural 
commodities imposed by OECD countries had decreased exports from non-OECD countries 
but slightly promoted intra-OECD trade (although not statistically significant).  
Next, we turn to regressions for specific sectors at HS-2 level. A glance at the 
frequency index of technical measures suggests that the following twelve agricultural sectors 
are regulated in OECD countries: dairy products (HS-04); live trees, cut flowers (HS-06); 
edible fruits, nuts (HS-08), coffee, tea, spices (HS-09); cereals (HS-10); milling products 
(HS-11); meat, fish preparations (HS-16); cereal preparations (HS-19); vegetable 
preparations (HS-20); edible preparations (HS-21); and beverages, spirits (HS-22). We fit the 
Heckman sample selection model with each subsample and report in table 3 the simple 
counts of different demand-enhancing effects and the trade-cost effects. The results on the 
demand-enhancing effects suggest that the role of technical measures as quality signals 
increases the chance of intra-OECD trade in eight out of the twelve intensively regulated 
sectors. Moreover, the volume of trade in three sectors would increase as result of the quality 
improvement if firms were not affected by the regulations. On the other hand, the estimates 
of the trade-cost effects indicate that technical measures significantly add to the variable 
costs of trade in three sectors, and the fixed costs of trade in three sectors. We find positive 
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trade-cost effects on the extensive margin for two sectors, which was surprising. One 
possible explanation is that the country-specific notifications of technical measures do not 
capture certain harmonization or mutually recognition of standards, which presumably 
reduces compliance cost considerably. 
Table 3. Summary of sectoral analysis of the effects of technical measures on intra-
OECD agricultural trade, 2004 
 Intensive margin Extensive margin 
Positive & stat. significant:  3 Positive & stat. significant: 8 
  Null:  9    Null:  4 
Demand-
enhancing 
effect Negative & stat. significant:  0 Negative & stat. significant: 0 
Positive & stat. significant: 0 Positive & stat. significant: 2 
  Null:  9    Null:  7 
Trade-cost 
effect 
Negative & stat. significant: 3 Negative & stat. significant: 3 
Note: Positive & stat. significant refers to positive and statistically significant at 10% level or lower; Negative 
& stat. significant refers to negative and statistically significant at 10% level or lower; Null refers to 
statistically insignificant at 10% level. 
 
Now we focus on two particular sectors, dairy products (HS-04) and cereal 
preparations (HS-19), in which both consumers and producers in OECD are found to be 
sensitive to technical measures. SPS/TBT issues in dairy products involve the use of Bst, a 
genetically engineered growth hormone that increases milk production, a dispute over 
mandatory pasteurization of cheese, and labeling of yogurts among others (Bureau and 
Doussin 1999). The technical regulations toward cereal preparations evolve around the 
Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) on mycotoxin residues that result from poor farm practice 
in high temperature and high humidity environments. In 2002, EU harmonized their MRLs 
on mycotoxins in several sectors, including cereal and vegetable preparations. Compared to 
the international standards (Codex Alimentarius), EU’s harmonized regulation is more 
stringent in terms of both allowable level and sampling methods, which triggered concerns 
about the potential trade loss borne by exporters (Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh 2001b). The 
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econometric results for the two sectors are reported in table 4 and the implied marginal 
effects of regressors in table 5.  
Table 4. Model results for intra-OECD trade in dairy products and cereal preparations 
Dairy 
products 
Trade 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Cereal 
preparation 
Trade 
Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
Quality 
θβ  
0.763*** 
(0.185) 
0.144*** 
(0.049) 
Quality 
θβ  
0.973*** 
(0.180) 
1.003*** 
(0.050) 
Trade Cost 
θγ−  
-0.848*** 
(0.216) 
-0.205*** 
(0.057) 
Trade Cost 
θγ−  
-0.748*** 
(0.217) 
-0.447*** 
(0.076) 
Tariff 
θ−  
-0.480* 
(0.264) 
-0.221*** 
(0.076) 
Tariff 
θ−  
-0.861 
(0.930) 
-0.598 
(0.372) 
Distance 
dbθ−  
-1.150*** 
(0.177) 
-0.641*** 
(0.042) 
Distance 
dbθ−  
-1.477*** 
(0.153) 
-0.642*** 
(0.066) 
Border 
bbθ  
1.300*** 
(0.197) 
0.407*** 
(0.106) 
Border 
bbθ  
0.959*** 
(0.238) 
0.166 
(0.171) 
Colony 
cbθ  
-0.109 
(0.254) 
0.050 
(0.110) 
Colony 
cbθ  
-0.073 
(0.269) 
0.326* 
(0.190) 
Language 
lbθ  
N.A. 0.258*** 
(0.096) 
Language 
lbθ  
N.A. 0.359** 
(0.145) 
Protectionis
t 
NTBs 
pbθ  
0.270 
(0.501) 
-0.073 
(0.078) 
 
Protectionist 
NTBs 
pbθ  
0.014 
(0.755) 
-0.509* 
(0.296) 
Inverse 
Mills Ratio 
0.718 
(0.390) 
 Inverse  
Mills Ratio 
0.212 
(0.359) 
Note: Inverse Mills Ratio is defined as in table 1. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote   
significance level at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. 
 
Table 5. Marginal effects on intra-OECD trade in dairy products and cereal 
preparations 
Dairy 
products 
Intensive 
Margin 
Extensive 
Margin 
Cereal 
preparation 
Intensive 
Margin 
Extensive 
Margin 
Demand-
enhancing 
Effect 
 0.763*** 
(0.185) 
0.163*** 
(0.057) 
Demand-
enhancing 
Effect 
 0.973*** 
(0.180) 
0.779*** 
(0.046) 
Trade-cost 
Effect 
-0.848*** 
(0.216) 
-0.232*** 
(0.065) 
Trade-cost 
Effect 
-0.748*** 
(0.217) 
-0.347*** 
(0.061) 
H0: zero net effect H0: zero net effect 
P value 
of 2χ -stat 
0.417 0.025 
 
P value 
of 2χ -stat 
0.260 0.000 
Note: Delta-method standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** are as defined in previous tables. 
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We first discuss the results for dairy products. As shown in table 4, both the demand-
enhancing effect and the trade-cost effect bear the expected signs and turn out statistically 
significant. In terms of the magnitude, table 5 suggests that the technical measures on dairy 
products depress the supply of exports more than they enhance consumer’s demand via 
information discloser and quality improvement. In fact, if an OECD importer adopts a new 
regulation while the trading partner doesn’t, the new measure would reduce the likelihood of 
trade between the two countries, as the net effect on the extensive margin is negative and 
statistically significant. The above results suggest that although OECD consumers in general 
place a premium on the dairy products of higher quality, but the compliance costs borne by 
producers prevent them from adopting new technologies and capturing some of these 
markets. 
Regarding cereal preparations, table 4 shows that both OECD consumers and 
producers seem to respond to technical regulations, with the demand-enhancing effect 
dominating the trade-cost effect in magnitude. Table 5 further confirms that agents on both 
sides of the market are affected by the technical measures, and that a new regulation is likely 
to increase the chance of intra-OECD trade in cereal preparations. The trade-promoting 
attribute of technical regulations in cereal products reflect several facts. OECD consumers 
are visibly concerned about mycotoxin contamination in food stuff and they are willing to 
pay a sizable premium for high-quality cereal products. For OECD exporters who are able to 
conform to these costly regulations, trade expands. Not captured here but documented 
elsewhere is the fact that non-OECD exporters have difficulty meeting these standards 
(Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni, 2008; Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh, 2001b) inducing 
some changes in sourcing these products from new OECD suppliers meeting the stricter 
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standards.    
The estimates of other trade determinants, in both sectors, are in line with a typical 
gravity equation analysis. Tariffs are found to be trade-impeding; the farther apart two 
countries are, the less the bilateral trade there is; a shared border and a common language 
between trading partners facilitate trade; NTBs other than technical regulations do not 
significantly affect the intra-OECD trade in dairy products and cereal preparations. 
Robustness and Specification Checks  
In this subsection, we conduct several robustness checks for our empirical 
application. One concern about the Heckman sample selection model is that it requires a 
variable in the selection equation to be excluded from the outcome equation. To see to the 
influence of the choice of excluded variable on results, we re-estimate the models when the 
colonial tie dummy variable in excluded. The associated results are almost identical to those 
reported in table 2 through 5.33  
Another criticism toward the use of the Heckman sample selection model is that the 
estimates can be biased if trade flow exhibits heteroskedasticity. One remedy to the problem 
is to use the PPML approach proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), in which the gravity 
equation is estimated in its multiplicative form instead of the logarithmically linear form and 
robust standard errors are used to accommodate heteroskedasticity. However, as Pham and 
Marin (2008) show, the PPML approach ignores the limited dependency of the trade flow 
and fails to explain the absence of trade. A variant to the PPML approach is the Zero-Inflated 
Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (ZIPPML) estimator which improves upon the 
                                                 
33 The econometric results are available from authors upon request. 
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standard PPML approach by accounting for the excessive zeros (Burger, van Oort, and 
Linders, 2009). One disadvantage with the ZIPPML approach is that the estimates vary as to 
the unit of the dependent variable varies.34 Nevertheless, we conduct the ZIPPML 
regressions and compare the results to those delivered by the Heckman models. In the 
augmented regressions, the demand-enhancing effects and the trade-cost effects found are 
qualitatively similar except that the trade-cost effect becomes positive in the pooled 
regression.35 The technical measures are shown to promote intra-OECD agricultural trade 
overall.  
Conclusions 
In this article, we propose a generalized gravity equation model in which the demand-
enhancing effect and the trade cost effect of technical measures can be disentangled. The 
approach allows examining whether technical measures affects international trade, if any, 
through shifting consumers’ demand curve via quality information disclosure, or shifting 
exporters’ supply curve via imposing compliance costs, or both. An application of the 
approach to the intra-OECD agricultural trade in 2004 suggests that technical measures foster 
trade within OECD because these measures enhance consumers’ demand for imports more 
than they hamper exporters’ supply of exports. Although we do not investigate North-South 
trade, our findings are relevant to the debate on “standards as barrier to or catalyst for trade.” 
We find that the willingness to pay of consumers in OECD countries increases with stricter 
regulation affecting quality of food. Hence, these standards do create new market 
                                                 
34 Both the selection and the outcome processes can generate zeros in the ZIPPML model. Hence, more zeros 
are attributed to the selection process when trade data are recoded say in dollars as opposed to in millions of 
dollars. 
35 The econometric results are available from authors upon request. 
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opportunities for exporters. We do not say anything on how exporters in the South succeed or 
fail to capture these markets. Nevertheless, the allegation that these technical measures are 
mostly driven by protectionism is invalid.  
More disaggregated analysis reveals that technical regulations on dairy products 
affect both consumers and producers in OECD, with trade-cost effect slightly dominating the 
demand-enhancing effect. On the other hand, technical measures on cereal preparations are 
shown to promote intra-OECD trade in the net because the enhancement of demand for high-
quality cereal products outweighs the decrease of supply due to the associated compliance 
costs. 
A promising extension would be to compile a panel data set and investigate the 
welfare effects of changes in technical measures. The time variation would allow the 
identification of all structural parameters in the proposed model and facilitate the 
computation of domestic and international welfares. Furthermore, one could also explicitly 
consider additive external effects on human/animal health and the environment based on 
currently available scientific evidence, which allows predicting the welfare implications of 
technical measures in the long-run. 
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Appendix 
Derivation of intensive margins, extensive margins, and unconditional marginal effects 
in the Heckman sample selection model 
In general, the selection equation determining firms’ self-selection to export is specified as 
(A1)     ).()0Pr( γXY Φ=>                                                                                                     
The outcome equation generating the trade flows conditional on trade taking place is 
specified as 
(A2)     ,)0|(ln IMRxYYE
k
kk ηβ +=> ∑                                                                             
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Let γˆ⋅′= xz  be the linear prediction from the selection equation; )ˆ()ˆ( zzIMR Φ=φ  is the 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio as in Heckman (1979), which corrects for the sample selection bias. 
Applying the rules of conditional expectations, we have 
).0Pr()0|()0Pr()0|()0Pr()0|()( >⋅>==⋅=+>⋅>= YYYEYYYEYYYEYE  
Taking the logarithm of the above equation, and then taking the derivative with respect to an 
exogenous variable, kx  for instance, we have 
(A3)     .)0Pr(ln)0|(ln)(ln
kkk x
Y
x
YYE
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∂                                                        
The above equation states that the overall marginal effect can be decomposed into an 
intensive margin 
kx
YYE
∂
>∂ )0|(ln , that is, the intensification of existing trade flows, and an 
extensive margin 
kx
Y
∂
>∂ )0Pr(ln , that is, the creation of new trade. Note that the extensive 
margin can be readily computed from the estimates in the selection equations. 
 
As Hoffman and Kassouf (2005) shows, 
kk x
YYE
x
YYE
∂
>∂=∂
>∂ )0|(ln)0|(ln  holds under some 
regular conditions.1 Therefore, the intensive margin can be computed as  
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where )5.0exp(
2
)( 2zzz −−=′ πφ  is the derivative of the standard normal density function. 
The above equation states that a trade determinant affects the trade level both directly and 
indirectly. 
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CHPATER 4. ESTIMATING GRAVITY EQUATION MODELS IN THE PRESENCE 
OF HETEROSKEDASTICITY AND FREQUENT 
 
 
Abstract 
Gravity equation models are widely used in international trade to assess the impact of various 
policies on the patterns of trade. Although recent literature provides solid micro-foundations 
for the gravity equation model, there is no consensus on how to estimate a gravity equation 
model in the presence of the two stylized features of trade data: frequent zeros and 
heteroskedasticity. We propose a Two-Step Nonlinear Least Square estimator that 
satisfactorily deals with both problems. Monte-Carlo experiments show that the proposed 
estimator strictly outperforms the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML), the 
Heckman sample selection model, and the E.T.-Tobit estimators, and that it weakly 
dominates the Truncated PPML model in the estimation of the intensive margin of trade. An 
empirical study of world trade in 1986 suggests that currency union and regional trade 
agreements facilitate trade primarily through improving market access, as opposed to 
intensifying pre-existing trade. 
Introduction 
The gravity equation model has been a long-time workhorse in international trade since 
Tinbergen (1962). It posits that the bilateral trade flow between any two countries can be 
explained by the two countries’ income levels, geographic distance, and various other factors 
that affect trade cost (such as import tariffs, non-tariff regulations, contiguity condition, 
historical colonial relationship, and religion similarity). In the past decade, the gravity 
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equation model has received even more recognition because of the development of its 
microeconomic foundations.36 Following Anderson (1979), Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) derives a full specification of the gravity equation model with trade costs based on the 
utility maximization behavior of a representative consumer with Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) preferences. Most importantly, they emphasize the importance of 
controlling for countries’ multi-lateral trade resistance terms in a cross-sectional gravity 
equation analysis. Novy (2010) innovates a gravity equation in a general equilibrium setting 
with a translog demand system. Markusen (1986) and Bergstrand (1985, 1989) introduce 
non-homothetic preferences in gravity equation models and explain the role of per-capital 
income in shaping trade patterns. Deardorff (1998) shows that a gravity equation can emerge 
from a Heckscher-Ohlin framework as well. Evenett and Keller (2002) report that both the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory and the monopolistic-competition trade theory can guide the gravity 
equation and that they provide insights to different components of the international variation 
of production and trade patterns. In a comprehensive review, Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose 
(2001) examine how various trade theories are linked to the gravity equation approach and 
provide evidence in favor of the monopolistic-competition theory and the reciprocal-dumping 
theory. More recently, Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) build up a generalized 
gravity equation from the behavior of firms that are heterogeneous in productivity and faced 
with fixed costs of exporting. Their model predicts that only the most productive firms are 
able to overcome the fixed cost of trade and penetrate foreign markets, and that trade 
liberalization induces more firms to participate in the world market. 
                                                 
36 Interested readers are referred to Anderson (2011) for a thorough review on the theoretical and empirical 
developments of the gravity equation approach to trade. 
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Although the microeconomic foundations of the gravity equation approach are well 
established, there is no consensus in the literature on how to statistically estimate a gravity 
equation in the presence of the two stylized features of trade data: frequent zeros and 
heteroskedasticity.37 On the one hand, the presence of zeros is quite common in trade data. In 
a cross-sectional analysis at the national level, e.g. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Helpman, 
Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), nearly 50% of the trade records are zeros. Even with panel 
data sets covering more recent years in agricultural trade, e.g., Sun and Reed (2010) and 
Grant and Boys (2012), the percentage of zeros is above 30%. The proper treatment of those 
zero trade flows is warranted from both the statistical and the economic viewpoints. 
Statistically, since zeros generally reflect countries’ inability to overcome the fixed cost of 
creating a trade partnership, the omission of such non-random zeros results in sample 
selection bias (Heckman, 1979). From an economic perspective, any mistreatment of zeros 
limits the model’s insights into how trade polices improve or hinder market access for small 
or sporadic traders, or the extensive margins to trade.38 The latter is of particular importance 
when the policies of interest play a major role in determining the cost of entering or surviving 
in world market. Shepherd (2010) shows the reduction in export costs, tariffs, and transport 
costs encourages developing countries to export to more destinations. Besedes and Prusa 
(2011) argue that developing countries are more likely to experience long-run export growth 
                                                 
37 Other empirical issues in the gravity equation model include how to control for the multi-lateral trade 
resistance terms, e.g., Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) and Baier and Bergstrand (2009), how to deal with 
endogeneity, e.g., Egger (2004) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007), etc. These topics are beyond the scope of the 
current study. 
38 Throughout the paper, we refer to the extensive margin to trade as the newly created trade partnership 
between countries. We do not deal with the newly entered firms (Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008), or 
the newly traded varieties (Hummels and Klenow, 2005) or the newly reached consumers (Akolakis, 2011) 
because we focus on aggregate trade flows. 
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if new entrants to world market have a better chance to survive beyond the first year.39 
Bergin and Lin (2009) demonstrate that currency unions facilitate international trade 
predominantly through increasing the number of exporting firms and the number of traded 
products. 
On the other hand, trade data often exhibit heteroskedasticity. The data sample of a 
gravity equation analysis usually consists of bilateral trade flows among countries that are 
different in so many characteristics that heteroskedasticity is likely to prevail. The direct 
implication of possible heteroskedasticity is that the gravity equation model should be 
estimated in its original multiplicative form, as opposed to its linear form after the 
logarithmic transformation. In fact, as Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show, estimates from log-
linearized gravity equation models are generally biased because the logarithmic 
transformation makes the error terms correlated with the explanatory variables. Needless to 
say, the presence of pervasive zeros and heteroskedasticity disqualifies the conventional 
Ordinary Least Square estimator that had been used for decades. As more advanced 
estimators for the gravity equation model are being suggested, two camps emerge in the 
literature. 
One camp in the debate focuses on the economics of zero trade flows. The new trade 
theory, e.g., Melitz (2003), Chaney (2008), and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), 
posits that the absence of trade results from firms’ self-selection behavior: zero trade flow is 
observed when none of the firms in the potential exporting country is productive enough to 
overcome the fixed costs. Therefore, zeros can be seen as generated from a selection process, 
                                                 
39 By using transactions data from several developing countries, Rauch (2011) points out that firms more 
diversified in terms of products and destinations are more likely to survive in the world market. 
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which naturally calls for the Heckman sample selection model (Heckman, 1979), or, to a less 
degree, the E.T.-Tobit (Eaton and Tamura, 1994) model. In a Heckman sample selection 
model, the zeros are attributed to a selection process that characterizes the agents’ self-
selection behavior. Conditioning on agents’ self-selection to trade, the volume of trade, in its 
log-scale, is then explained by various trade determinants and one additional term correcting 
for the potential sample selection bias. In a similar spirit, the E.T.-Tobit model considers 
zeros as censored outcomes and assumes that there is minimal threshold to jump if trade 
flows are to be observed. The main advantage of the Heckman sample selection model or the 
E.T.-Tobit model is that both connect well with trade theories and deliver rich comparative 
statics. In particular, with the Heckman sample selection model or the E.T.-Tobit model, one 
can decompose the effect of trade liberalization into the intensive margin, or the 
intensification of existing trade, and the extensive margin, or the creation of new trade 
partnership. From an international development viewpoint, the identification of the extensive 
margin is relevant if the question of interest is how small exporters’ access to foreign markets 
is affected. Nevertheless, built upon the log-linearized version of the gravity equation, the 
Heckman sample selection model or the E.T.-Tobit model may deliver inconsistent estimates 
when trade data exhibits heteroskedasticity, because the error terms often evolves with 
explanatory variables after the logarithmic transformation. 
The other camp in the debate advocates estimating the gravity equation in its 
multiplicative form and resorting to a variant of the count data models. Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006) propose the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator for the gravity 
equation model. By estimating the gravity equation in its multiplicative form, the PPML 
estimator avoids the logarithmic transformation and can be shown to be robust to a wide 
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range of heteroskedastic patterns. However, Martin and Pham (2008) note that the PPML 
estimates are severely biased when zero records are frequent and the trade data is limitedly 
dependent in nature. Although Silva and Tenreyro (2011) reply that the PPML estimator is 
adaptive to prevalent zeros, it fails to separate the extensive margins from the intensive 
margins. Burger, Linders, and Oort (2009) consider several extensions of the PPML 
estimator, i.e., the Negative Binomial Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator (NBPML), the 
Zero Inflated Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator (ZIPPML), and the Zero 
Inflated Negative Binomial Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator (ZINBPML). In spite 
that all three variants have their own advantages, such as allowing over-dispersion and 
excessive zeros, none of them is robust to the re-scaling of the dependant variable (e.g., 
measuring trade in dollars or in thousands of dollars gives different estimates). Such 
drawback arguably prevents NBPML, ZIPPML, and ZINBPML from being widely used. 
We reconcile the two camps by proposing a Two-Step Nonlinear Least Square (TS-
NLS) estimator that proves robust to pervasive zeros and heteroskedasticity. The estimator 
works as follows. In the first step, all zeros are explained by a selection process in which the 
country-pair decide to trade or not, and the extensive margins are computed accordingly. In 
the second step, positive trade flows are characterized by a gravity equation in its 
multiplicative form, augmented by one extra term correcting for the sample selection bias. A 
weighted Nonlinear Least Square method, coupled with robust covariance estimates (White, 
1980), is used to estimate the augmented gravity equation and derive the intensive margin. 
The Monte-Carlo experiments suggest that the proposed TS-NLS estimator strictly dominates 
the Heckman, PPML, and E.T.-Tobit models, and that it weakly outperforms the Truncated 
PPML model in term of the estimation of the intensive margin. Additionally, the TS-NLS 
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sheds light on the extensive margin of trade to which the Truncated PPML fails to address. 
An empirical study of world bilateral trade in 1986 shows that currency union and regional 
trade agreements promote trade primarily through improving market access (or the extensive 
margin), rather than via intensifying pre-existing trade (or the intensive margin). 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the gravity 
equation model setup and proposes the Two-Step Nonlinear Least Square estimator. Section 
3 uses a set of Monte-Carlo experiments to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
estimator relative to its competitors. Section 4 applies the TS-NLS estimator to the dataset in 
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) and discusses the trade effects of currency unions 
and regional trade agreements. Section 5 concludes the presentation and suggests directions 
for future research. 
The Gravity Equation and the Two-Step Nonlinear Least Square Estimator 
International trade theory underlying the gravity equation approach posits that Country j ’s  
import from Country i  can be characterized by the following equation: 
(1)       γβα ijjiij DXXT = ,   
where iX  and jX  are Country i  and j ’s characteristics respectively. Such characteristics 
usually include each country’s GDP, total population, per-capita income, remoteness to the 
rest of the world, etc. ijD  contains any trade cost terms that are specific to the particular 
country-pair, e.g., applied tariff rates, geographic distance, contiguity condition, historical 
colonial relationship, religion similarity, and the existence of preferential trade agreements.40 
                                                 
40 Interested readers are referred to Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) for a detailed discussion of the modeling 
of trade costs. 
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α ,β , andγ are parameters to be estimated. Noticeably, the bilateral trade flow, ijT , is always 
positive according to (1). However, in practice, we frequently observe some countries not 
trading with each other, or not trading certain commodities in certain years. Therefore, (1) by 
itself does not constitute a complete specification when it comes to statistical estimation.  
 To explicitly account for the absence of trade , we introduce a selection process to 
capture countries’ self-selection to trade/not trade. Specifically, we set up the empirical 
gravity equation model as follows: 
(2a)     ijijjiij DXXT μγβα +=* ,                              
(2b)     ijijjiij DXXd υγβα +++= ~~~~~~* ,                     
(2c)     )0( * >= ijij dId ,                                         
(2d)     *ijijij TdT = ,                                                
where *ijT  is the notional trade flow from country i  to country j  when the two countries 
decide to trade.41 *ijd  is the latent variable for the binary outcome ijd  which equals one if the 
two countries trade, and 0 otherwise; ijT  is the observed trade flow. As in Heckman (1979), 
we assume ijμ  and ijυ  are two idiosyncratic terms following a bivariate normal 
distribution.42 Specifically, 11 12
21 22
0
,
0
ij ij ij
ij ij ij
u
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σ σ
υ σ σ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞→ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
, where ijijij σσσ ≡= 2112 . The 
correlation between the two idiosyncratic terms can be caused by some omitted variables that 
                                                 
41 The concept of the notional trade is similar to the desired amount of trade as defined by Ranjan and Tobias 
(2007). 
42 Without any distributional assumption, it is difficult to deal with the issue of sample selection, unless an 
informative instrumental variable is available. See Wang, Shao, and Kim (2011) for a case study of the 
instrumental variable approach. 
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both affect the fixed costs and the variable costs of bilateral trade. Noticeably, the variance of 
iju , ij11σ , varies across observations, allowing possible heteroskedasticity. The model setup, 
(2a)-(2d), is appealing in several aspects. First of all, the gravity equation, (2a), is expressed 
in its multiplicative form, thus is free from the bias due to logarithmic transformation. 
Furthermore, as elaborated below, when the conditional (on trade taking place) expectation 
of (2d) is correctly derived, a nonlinear least square procedure can be used to yield consistent 
estimates even if heteroskedasticity prevails. Secondly, (2b)-(2c) fully attributes zero trade 
flows to countries’ self-selection not to trade. Moreover, any factor potentially affecting the 
fixed costs of creating trade partnership can be included in (2b). Thirdly, the characterization 
of observed trade flows in (2d) facilities the decomposition of the extensive and intensive 
margins to trade: a potential trade determinant can affect the bilateral trade, ijT , either by 
varying the market accessibility, ijd , or by altering the volume of trade, 
*
ijT , or both. 
The system (2a)-(2d) is estimated via a two-step procedure. In the first step, we 
estimate (2b)-(2c) via a standard Probit model.43 Mathematically, the probability of 
observing a positive trade from Country i  to Country j  is represented as: 
(3a)     Pr(dij =1) = Φ(( α X i + β X j + γ Dij ) / σ 22ij ) ≡ Φ(W ij ⋅θ ) . 
Defining the extensive margin to trade as the marginal effect on the log-scaled probability of 
trade, we compute the extensive margin with respect to a change in ijx as 
(3b)     ∂ ln(Pr(dij =1)) ∂x ij = γ x ij / σ 22ij ϕ(W ij ⋅θ ) Φ(W ij ⋅θ ).     
                                                 
43 To allow heteroskedasticity in the Probit model, we use the robust variance-covariance estimates (White, 
1980) for the purpose of inference. 
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In the second step, we characterize the volume of trade conditioning on trade taking 
place. Since  ijμ  and ijυ  follow a bivariate normal distribution with covariance ijσ , one can 
derive the conditional mean of the observed trade flow as: 
(4a)     22( | 1) /ij ij i j ij ij ij ijE T d X X D
α β γ σ σ λ= = + .                
where ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ij ij ijW Wλ ϕ θ θ= Φ  is the Inverse Mill’s Ratio (Heckman, 1979) calculated from 
the first-step estimation. Intuitively, (4a) states that the observed trade flow can be explained 
by a gravity equation augmented by an additional term that corrects for the potential sample 
selection bias. In the extreme case where the error terms in the outcome process (2a) and the 
selection process (2b) are uncorrelated, or 0ijσ = , (4a) reduces to a conventional gravity 
equation in its multiplicative form. Furthermore, one may speculate that size of trade 
amplifies sample selection bias: if the size of trade is large, the actively exporting countries 
are presumably much more productive than non-exporting countries, which means that 
investigating actively trading countries only leads to a more selected sample. Therefore, we 
posit that 22/ij ijσ σ  is proportional to the size of trade. Specifically, 
(4b)     22/ij ij i j ijX X D
α β γσ σ ω= ,                   
where ω  is a parameter to be estimated.44 Substituting (4b) into (4a), we have 
(4c)     )1()1|( ijijjiijij DXXdTE ωλγβα +⋅== .             
We can estimate (4c) via the weighted nonlinear least square method as in Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006). The resulting estimates are consistent as long as (4c) is correctly specified. 
Moreover, we use the heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator (White, 
                                                 
44 As a sensitivity analysis in Section 3 shows, TS-NLS estimates are biased when the assumption does not 
hold. However, estimates delivered by alternative models are even more biased.  
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1980) to construct standard errors, so that the statistical inference is resistant to 
heteroskedasticity in the gravity equation. The intensive margin to trade, defined as the 
marginal effect on the percentage change in the volume of trade is computed as: 
(4d)     )]
)(
)('
(
1
[))1|(ln( 2ij
ij
ij
ij
kkikijij W
W
xdTE λθ
θφ
ωλ
ωθβ −Φ++=∂=∂ ,       
where '( )ϕ ⋅  is derivative of the normal density function. Intuitively, (4d) shows that the 
intensive margin consists of two parts, with the direct impact given by kβ  and the indirect 
impact, through affecting the self-selection behavior, represented by the second term on the 
right hand side. The overall marginal effect, if the variable of interest is deemed to affect 
both the fixed and variable costs of trade, is simply the sum of the extensive margin (3b) and 
the intensive margin (4d): 
(5a)     ln ( ) ln(Pr( 1)) ln( ( | 1))ij ij ij ij ij ij ijE T x d x E T d x∂ ∂ = ∂ = ∂ + ∂ = ∂ , 
or, 
(5b)     2
'( )
ln ( ) [ ( ) ]
1 ( )
ij
ij ij k k ij ij
ij ij
W
E T x
W
ϕ θωβ θ λ λωλ θ∂ ∂ = + − ++ Φ .          
We now compare the proposed TS-NLS estimator with the alternative estimators in 
the literature, i.e., the Heckman model, the E.T.-Tobit model, and the PPML estimator.45 The 
treatment of zeros in the TS-NLS estimator is similar to that in the Heckman sample 
selection model or the E.T.-Tobit model: all three models attribute zeros to countries’ self-
selection to no trade. However, only the TS-NLS model is free from the logarithmic 
transformation bias. Another advantage of the proposed TS-NLS estimator over the Heckman 
                                                 
45 We do not consider the variants of PPML, namely, NBPML, ZIPPML, and ZINBPML, because of their 
vulnerability to re-scaling of the dependent variable, as mentioned above. 
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procedure is that the identification of the TS-NLS model does not require an excluded 
variable in practice.46 Compared to the PPML estimator which uses one single process to 
explain both positive and zero trade flows, the TS-NLS model accommodates zeros in a way 
that coherently follows the implications of the new trade theory and allows researchers to 
disentangle the intensive margins to trade and the extensive margins to trade. To further 
identify the sources of bias inherited in the PPML estimator, we derive the unconditional 
expectation from (4c) and get 
(6)       ( ) (1 ) ( )ij i j ij ij ijE T X X D W
α β γ ωλ θ= ⋅ + ⋅Φ ⋅ .  
Hence, the PPML estimates are generally biased due to its ignorance of both the sample 
selection issue and the impact from the extensive margin. A glance at (4c) also suggests that 
the TS-NLS model nests the truncated PPML model, i.e., a PPML model applied to the 
subsample containing positive trade flows only, as a special case when idiosyncratic terms in 
the selection process and the outcome process are uncorrelated ( 0ω = ). Admittedly, the 
consistency of the proposed TS-NLS estimates relies on the joint normality assumption. In 
particular, the conditional mean of (4c) could be mis-specified if the normality assumption 
was violated. A specification test can be used to justify the normality assumption. As we 
show in Section 4, the specification in (4c) easily survives the Reset specification test 
(Ramsey, 1969). 
The Monte-Carlo Experiments 
In this section, we conduct a set of Monte-Carlo experiments to assess the performance of the 
proposed TS-NLS estimator and the alternative estimators: the PPML model, the Heckman 
                                                 
46 The near linearity of the Inverse Mills’ Ratio often makes the second stage of the Heckman procedure 
unidentifiable. See Puhani (2000) for more detailed discussions. 
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procedure, and the E.T.-Tobit model. To investigate the finite sample properties of each 
estimator, we report its bias, variance, and mean square error.47 
For simplicity, we introduce two explanatory variables 1x  and 2x . Mimicking a 
continuous trade cost (such as distance), 1x  is a continuous variable drawn from a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and variance 0.1, i.e., 1 (0,0.1)x N∼ .48 To proxy a categorical trade 
cost term (such as colonial relationship), 2x  is constructed as a binary variable that follows a 
Bernoulli distribution with 0.4 as its probability of success, i.e., 2 (0.4)x Bern∼ . The data is 
generated from the following system. 
(6a)     * 0 1 1 2 2exp( )i i i iT x xβ β β μ= + + + ,                              
(6b)     * 0 1 1 2 2i i i id x xγ γ γ υ= + + + ,                     
(6c)     *( 0)i id I d= > ,                                         
(6d)     *i i iT d T= ⋅ , 
where 11 12
21 22
0
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0
i i i
i i i
u
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v
σ σ
σ σ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∼ , and 1,2,..i N= . We assign the following true values 
for the parameters in (6a): 0 0.5β = − , 1 2 1β β= = . To allow heteroskedasticity, we consider 
three functional forms for 11iσ : (i) homoskedastic errors, or 11 0.015iσ = ; (ii) heteroskedastic 
errors, i.e., the variance is proportional to the mean, or 11 0.03i imσ = , where 
0 1 1 1 2exp( )i i im x xβ β β≡ + + ; (iii) super-heteroskedastic errors, i.e., the variance is a quadratic 
functional form of the mean, or  211 0.02 0.02i i im mσ = + . 
                                                 
47 We do not investigate the asymptotic properties because the objective of allowing heteroskedasticity rules out 
a full likelihood characterization. 
48 We set a relative small variance because the variation gets larger after the exponential transformation. 
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Now we turn to the parameterization of the selection process (6b)-(6c). We set 1 1γ = , 
so that the factor represented by 1x  positively affects the outcome T  through both the 
selection and outcome processes. We let 2 0γ = , so that the variable proxi-ed by 2x  
influences the outcome process only. In the context of international trade, we can interpret 1x  
as some determinant that potentially affects both the decision to trade and the trade volume, 
and consider 2x  as a factor merely impacting the trade volume. We consider two true values 
of 0γ : either 0 0.85γ = , in which case zeros account for about 20% of the sample, or 0 0γ = , 
in which case zeros take up 50% of all observations. We refer to the formal case as the “few 
zeros” scenario and the latter as the “many zeros” scenario. We set 22 1iσ =  (A sensitivity 
analysis will be conducted later to allow heteroskedasticity in the selection process). Lastly, 
we assume the covariance between the two idiosyncratic terms is proportional to the mean of 
the outcome process, i.e., 12 0.04i imσ =  (A sensitivity analysis of this proportionality 
assumption will be conducted later in the section). Given the true values of 11iσ  and 22iσ , 
such parameterization of 12iσ  implies that the average correlation between the selection 
process and the outcome process, conditioning on all observables, is 0.35 in (i), 0.23 in (ii), 
and 0.20 in (iii). 
To sum up, we have a total of six scenarios: (1) few zeros and homoskedastic errors, 
(2) few zeros and heteroskedastic error, (3) few zeros and super-heteroskedastic error, (4) 
many zeros and homoskedastic error, (5) many zeros and heteroskedastic error, and (6) many 
zeros and super-heteroskedastic error. Under each scenario, we generate a sample of 1000 
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observations ( 1000N = ) and apply each estimator to the data. We iterate the exercise for 
1000 times and report the results in Table 1. 
Table 1. Simulation results under six scenarios 
 
 
estimator 
 
 
x 
Few zeros 
(20%) 
 
Many zeros 
(50%) 
  Bias ˆ 1β −  Var. ˆvar( )β  Mean Square 
Error 
 
 
 
Bias ˆ 1β −  Var. ˆvar( )β  Mean Square 
Error 
 
Homoskedasticity: the variance is a constant 
1 0.334 0.033 0.145 0.770 0.158 0.750 PPML 
2 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.004 
1 -0.016 0.002 0.002 -0.017 0.010 0.011 T-PPML 
2 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 -0.133 2.908 2.926 0.042 14.73 14.74 Heckman 
2 0.020 0.878 0.878 -0.025 1.241 1.241 
1 -0.349 1.375 1.497 -0.030 2.716 2.717 Tobit 
2 -0.694 0.052 0.534 -0.801 0.034 0.676 
1 -0.010 0.002 0.002 -0.023 0.003 0.003 TS-NLS 
2 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Heteroskedasticity: the variance is linear in the mean 
1 0.318 0.034 0.136 0.768 0.157 0.747 PPML 
2 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 
1 -0.016 0.004 0.004 -0.013 0.015 0.015 T-PPML 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
1 -0.063 3.505 3.509 0.043 18.44 18.44 Heckman 
2 0.045 2.470 2.472 0.073 7.526 7.531 
1 -0.285 1.284 1.365 -0.014 2.804 2.804 Tobit 
2 -0.675 0.054 0.510 -0.800 0.033 0.674 
1 -0.008 0.004 0.004 -0.014 0.006 0.006 TS-NLS 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
Super-Heteroskedasticity: the variance is quadratic in the mean 
1 0.324 0.045 0.149 0.742 0.169 0.720 PPML 
2 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.005 
1 -0.012 0.006 0.006 -0.017 0.014 0.014 T-PPML 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 0.127 5.001 5.017 0.279 85.21 85.29 Heckman 
2 0.000 0.317 0.317 -0.056 1.785 1.788 
1 -0.277 1.552 1.629 -0.046 3.022 3.025 Tobit 
2 -0.676 0.056 0.513 -0.804 0.036 0.682 
1 -0.002 0.006 0.006 -0.017 0.009 0.009 TS-NLS 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
We discuss the performance of each estimator in turn. As shown in Table 1, the 
PPML estimates of 1β  are biased upward by more than 30% when zeros are few, and by 
more than 70% when zeros are many. The reason is that, without differentiating the selection 
process from the outcome process, the PPML estimates tend to co-find the effects through 1β  
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and 1γ , as illustrated by (6). Moreover, as the percentage of zeros increases, the impact from 
the selection process assumes more weight, leading to more biased PPML estimates. On the 
other hand, the PPML estimates of 2β  are close to the true value, with the bias below 0.2% 
when zeros are few and below 0.3% when zeros are many, because the variable of interest 
affects the outcome stage only. Overall, as in Martin and Pham (2008), we find that the 
PPML estimates can be severely biased when the outcome is limitedly dependent in nature.49 
Nevertheless, the PPML results are quite stable across different heteroskedastic patterns, as 
claimed in Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Interestingly, the Truncated PPML model performs 
better than the regular PPML model. Specifically, its estimates of 1β  and 2β are biased 
downward by less than 2% and 0.1% respectively. This is because the only source of bias in 
the Truncated PPML procedure, according to (4c), is the ignorance of non-random sample 
selection. In terms of the direction of the bias, since the correlation between the two 
idiosyncratic terms is assumed to be positive and the Inverse Mill’s Ratio is a decreasing 
function, we expect the Truncated PPML model to under-estimate the true effects. In 
addition, the variances of the Truncated PPML estimates increase rapidly as the proportion of 
zeros increases, suggesting that the Truncated PPML model suffers from efficiency loss due 
to its ignorance of zero outcomes. 
Now we turn to the Heckman sample selection model. Three features are worth 
noting. First, the Heckman estimates are biased. The bias of the Heckman estimate of 1β  
ranges from -13% to 13% when zeros are few, and from 4% to 28% when zeros are many. 
                                                 
49 In Appendix II, we conduct another set of experiments in which 1γ  is set to be negative. It turns out that the 
PPML estimates are biased downward. 
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The Heckman estimates of 2β  are also biased (although to a lesser degree). Second, the 
estimates from the Heckman model change drastically as the heteroskedastic pattern changes. 
This confirms that the logarithmic transformation imbedded in the Heckman procedure 
results in non-trivial biases. Therefore, the Heckman model is undesirable when 
heteroskedasticity is present. Thirdly, the variances of the Heckman estimate are very large, 
illustrating the identification problem caused by the Inverse Mill’s Ratio. A glance at the 
E.T.-Tobit models reveals that the corresponding estimates are severely biased in most 
scenarios, as found in Silva and Tenreyro (2006). 
Next, we discuss the performance of the proposed TS-NLS estimator. The TS-NLS 
estimate of 1β  is reasonably accurate, with the bias below 1% (2.5%) when zeros are few 
(many) across all scenarios of heteroskedasticity. The TS-NLS estimate of 2β  performs even 
better, evidenced by its small bias and variance in all cases. These findings confirm that the 
proposed TS-NLS estimator is capable of dealing with both heteroskedasticity and sample 
selection. Noticeably, under “many zeros” scenarios, the Truncated PPML model is slightly 
preferable over the TS-NLS model as far as bias is concerned. Nevertheless, according to the 
statistic of mean square error (which takes into account both bias and variance), the TS-NLS 
model remains the most suitable among all five estimators.  
Several robustness checks are warranted before we close the section. One legitimate 
concern is about possible heteroskedasticity in the selection process. Since so far we have 
been dealing with heteroskedasticity in the outcome process, it can be asked if the TS-NLS 
estimator is robust to heteroskedasticity in the selection stage as well. To address this 
concern, we conduct another set of Monte-Carlo experiments in which we impose 
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22 1 11.43exp( )i ixσ γ= , so that the variance of the error term in the selection equation increases 
in its mean.50 We re-estimate all the models and report the results in Table 2. Another issue 
worth considering is the assumption that the covariance of the two idiosyncratic terms is 
proportional to the mean of the outcome process. To examine to what extent the TS-NLS 
model is sensitive to this assumption, we generate new data by assuming a constant 
covariance, 12 0.1iσ = , and conduct all the estimation procedures again. The associated 
results are also reported in Table 2. 
Table 2: Robustness checks in cases of many zeros (50%) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 We intentionally scale up the variance by a factor of 1.43 to ensure the new selection process is more noisy 
than in the benchmark.  
 
 
estimator 
 
x 
Check 1
Selection is heteroskedastic 
Check 2:  
Covariance is constant 
  Bias ˆ 1β −  Var. ˆvar( )β  Mean Square 
Error 
 
 
Bias ˆ 1β −  Var. ˆvar( )β  Mean Square 
Error 
 
Homoskedasticity: the variance is a constant 
1 0.612 0.133 0.508 0.639 0.158 0.566 PPML 
2 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.079 0.005 0.011 
1 -0.022 0.010 0.010 -0.117 0.010 0.024 T-PPML 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.075 0.000 0.006 
1 0.057 29.02 29.02 0.157 8.800 8.825 Heckman 
2 -0.315 56.35 56.45 0.108 4.089 4.101 
1 -0.254 2.145 2.209 -0.430 1.225 1.410 Tobit 
2 -0.803 0.033 0.678 -0.849 0.024 0.744 
1 -0.027 0.003 0.003 -0.124 0.002 0.017 TS-NLS 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.075 0.000 0.006 
 
Heteroskedasticity: the variance is linear in the mean 
1 0.630 0.141 0.538 0.643 0.164 0.577 PPML 
2 0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.075 0.004 0.010 
1 -0.026 0.011 0.012 -0.122 0.012 0.027 T-PPML 
2 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.075 0.000 0.006 
1 -0.355 36.73 36.86 0.374 10.79 10.93 Heckman 
2 0.150 27.80 27.82 0.075 1.392 1.398 
1 -0.130 2.952 2.969 -0.146 1.999 2.020 Tobit 
2 -0.812 0.030 0.689 -0.825 0.031 0.711 
1 -0.027 0.005 0.006 -0.125 0.005 0.020 TS-NLS 
2 0.001 0.000 0.000
 
-0.075 0.000 0.006
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Table 2. (continued) 
 
 
estimator 
 
 
x 
Check 1 
Selection is heteroskedastic 
Check 2:  
Covariance is constant 
  Bias ˆ 1β −  Var. ˆvar( )β  Mean Square 
Error 
 
 
 
Bias ˆ 1β −  Var. ˆvar( )β  Mean Square 
Error 
 
Super-Heteroskedasticity: the variance is quadratic in the mean 
1 0.613 0.163 0.539 0.653 0.151 0.577 PPML 
2 -0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.075 0.004 0.010 
1 -0.022 0.015 0.016 -0.110 0.018 0.030 T-PPML 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.075 0.000 0.006 
1 0.001 30.60 30.60 0.696 16.09 16.57 Heckman 
2 2.179 5056 5060 0.029 1.756 1.757 
1 -0.016 2.911 2.911 -0.009 2.792 2.792 Tobit 
2 -0.803 0.037 0.682 -0.815 0.030 0.695 
1 -0.026 0.008 0.009 0.120 0.007 0.021 TS-NLS 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.075 0.000 0.006 
Note: for succinctness, we only report the scenarios with 50% zeros. 
 
We first discuss the cases with heteroskedasticity in the selection mechanism. As 
shown in Table 2, the performance of each estimator is qualitatively similar to the baseline 
cases in Table 1: the estimates from the PPML, the Heckman, and Tobit models are severely 
biased. The Truncated PPML and the TS-NLS estimators perform relatively well, with the 
magnitude of bias below 3%. In terms of mean square error, the TS-NLS model remains 
preferable over the Truncated PPML model because of the efficiency gain from 
accommodating zeros. Now we turn to the cases in which the covariance between the two 
error terms is constant. As shown in Table 2, such re-parameterization increases the biases of 
the TS-NLS estimates to 12% for 1β  and 8% for 2β . The reason is the conditional mean in 
the second stage of the TS-NLS model, (4c), is not correctly specified when the covariance is 
not proportional to the mean. Nevertheless, the TS-NLS model still dominates all other four 
estimators according to the mean square error criteria. Therefore, we conclude from the 
current section that the TS-NLS model strictly dominates the PPML, the Heckman, and the 
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E.T.-Tobit models, and that it weakly outperforms the Truncated PPML model in terms of 
the estimation of the intensive margin. 
An Empirical Application 
In this section, we illustrate our proposed TS-NLS procedure with an investigation of the 
impact of various trade costs on world trade in 1986. In terms of the choice of estimator, we 
apply the proposed Two-Step Nonlinear Least Square (TS-NLS) estimator, along with the 
(PPML) estimator, the Heckman sample selection model, and the E.T.-Tobit model. The 
comparison across models suggests that the both statistical and economic inferences are 
sensitive to the choice of the estimation method. Several diagnostic tools further demonstrate 
the capability of the TS-NLS model for the estimation of a gravity equation model in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and frequent zeros. 
 The Data 
Drawn from Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), the data cover bilateral trade flows 
among 158 countries in 1986.51 The trade determinants of interest include the geographic 
distance, the common border dummy variable, the island dummy variable, the landlocked 
dummy variable, the historical tie, the currency union dummy variable, the common legal 
system dummy variable, the common religion variable, and the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
dummy variable. Table 3 provides the definitions and summary statistics of the variables. 
Noticeably, more than half of the trade flows are recorded as zeros, which calls for careful 
treatment when it comes to statistical estimation. In addition, a cross-sectional sample 
                                                 
51 Although the original data in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) covers 1980-1989, their main results 
are based on the analysis of the 1986’s cross-section. Another reason for using a cross-sectional dataset is that 
the associated results are more comparable to those obtained in Silva and Tenreyro (2006), in which a snap-shot 
of the world trade in 1990 was considered. 
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comprising a large set of heterogeneous countries may give rise to a considerable degree of 
heteroskedasticity. Therefore, the data set serves well as an example of a gravity equation 
model in which both the prevalence of zeros and the possibility of heteroskedasticity should 
be satisfactorily dealt with. 
Table 3: Variable definition and summary statistics 
Variable Definition mean st. dev. min max 
ijtrade
a,b country j ’s import from country 
i  
8348.5 1075389 0 8.7e+7 
ijdist  log-scaled distance between 
country i  and j  
4.18 0.78 -0.15 5.66 
ijreligion  see note c for the definition 0.18 0.25 0 0.999 
ijborder  Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
country i  and j  are adjacent 
0.02 0.13 
ijisland  Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
either country i  or j  belongs to 
an island 
0.37 0.48 
ijlandlock
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
either country i  or j  is 
landlocked 
0.27 0.44 
ijcolony  Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
country i  or j  had a colonial tie 
0.01 0.10 
ijlanguage
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
country i  or j  use the same 
official language 
0.29 0.45 
ijcu  Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
country i  and j  use the same 
currency 
0.01 0.10 
ijlegal  Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
country i  and j  have the same 
legal system 
0.37 0.48 
ijFTA  Dummy variable that equals one if 
country i  and j  belong to a 
regional trade agreement. 
0.01 0.08 
 
Note: a. The number of observation is 24806(=158*157); b. The percentage of zero trade flows is 55.1%. c. 
% of Protestants in country i  * % of Protestants in country j  + % of Catholics in country i  * % of Catholics 
in country j + % of Muslims in country i  * % of Muslims in country j . 
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Results and Discussions 
We apply the PPML, the Truncated PPML, the Heckman sample selection, the E.T.-Tobit, 
and the TS-NLS estimators to the data and discuss how different methods of estimation 
change the statistical and economic inferences. From the gravity equation framework, we 
expect bilateral trade to be smaller if the two countries are further apart, or one of them is 
isolated in an island, or one of them has no costal lines. On the other hand, we speculate that 
scale of trade is larger if the two countries are adjacent, or had a colonial relationship in 
history, or adopt the same legal or currency system, or share common religious beliefs, or 
engage in a regional trade agreement. The econometric results associated with all five 
estimators are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. Results of the PPML, Heckman, E.T.-Tobit, and TS-NLS models 
TS-NLS  Heckman E.T.-Tobit PPML PPML>0 
Probit NLS 
ijdist
a -1.21*** 
(0.03) 
-1.21*** 
(0.03) 
-0.64*** 
(0.04) 
-0.64*** 
(0.04) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.68*** 
(0.05) 
ijreligion  excluded
b 0.34*** 
(0.07) 
-0.23** 
(0.11) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
0.37*** 
(0.06) 
-0.44*** 
(0.13) 
ijborder  0.44*** 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
0.72*** 
(0.11) 
0.73*** 
(0.11) 
0.30*** 
(0.09) 
0.62*** 
(0.11) 
ijisland  -0.42*** 
(0.11) 
-0.55*** 
(0.09) 
0.38** 
(0.19) 
0.41** 
(0.19) 
-0.43*** 
(0.08) 
0.33 
(0.21) 
ijlandlock  -0.57*** 
(0.16) 
-0.49*** 
(0.13) 
-0.57*** 
(0.21) 
-0.56*** 
(0.21) 
-0.23** 
(0.10) 
-0.69*** 
(0.23) 
ijcolony  1.31*** 
(0.13) 
1.17*** 
(0.11) 
0.35*** 
(0.12) 
0.36*** 
(0.11) 
0.28 
(0.26) 
0.32** 
(0.14) 
ijlanguage
 
0.22*** 
(0.05) 
0.43*** 
(0.05) 
-0.18** 
(0.09) 
-0.16* 
(0.09) 
0.31*** 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
ijcu  1.39*** 
(0.21) 
1.19*** 
(0.19) 
0.58 
(0.44) 
0.46 
(0.44) 
0.78*** 
(0.12) 
0.94 
(0.60) 
ijlegal  0.49*** 
(0.04) 
0.33*** 
(0.04) 
0.31*** 
(0.06) 
0.28*** 
(0.06) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.29*** 
(0.07) 
ijFTA  0.74*** 
(0.16) 
0.61*** 
(0.20) 
0.23*** 
(0.08) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
1.99*** 
(0.25) 
0.12 
(0.08) 
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Table 4. (continued) 
TS-NLS  Heckman E.T.-Tobit PPML PPML>0 
Probit NLS 
ijIMR
c 0.26*** 
(0.06) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.37*** 
(1.09) 
fixed 
effectsd 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Note: a. In the Probit model, the distance variable is expressed in levels, instead of logs, to help with the 
identification in the second stage; b. Following HMR, the religion variable is excluded from the second-stage 
of the Heckman procedure; c. Inverse Mill’s Ratio is calculated from the first-stage Probit model; d. fixed 
effects are dummy variables for each importer and each exporter. *, **, and *** denote the significance level 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
The results from the Heckman sample selection model are presented in the second 
column of Table 4. Qualitatively, the Heckman results are similar to those reported in 
Helpman, Meltiz, and Rubinstein (2008) in which the effect of the number of exporting firms 
is controlled for.52 In fact, the effects of all trade determinants bear the expected signs and 
are statistically significant. Moreover, the Inverse Mill’s Ratio is highly significant, implying 
that the sample selection is indeed non-random in this current study. The results from the 
E.T.-Tobit model are reported in the third column of Table 4. In terms of the signs of 
estimated coefficients and significant levels, the E.T.-Tobit model yields similar inferences 
as in the Heckman model, except that the border effect becomes insignificant in the E.T.-
Tobit model. The similarity between the Heckman and E.T.-Tobit results is partly 
attributable to their similarity in the underlying assumptions. Specifically, both the Heckman 
model and the E.T.-Tobit model consider zero trade flows as countries’ inability to trade: the 
former achieves the goal by adding a selection process, while the latter allows trade records 
to be censored once they are below a minimal threshold. However, both models are likely to 
                                                 
52 We do not account for the number of exporting firms because such new firm’s margin is often mis-specified 
in the presence of heteroskedasticity (Silva and Tenreyro, 2009). Nevertheless, the Heckman model generates 
similar inferences on all trade cost terms except for the island dummy variable (whose effect changes from 
negative and statistically insignificant in HMR to negative and statistically significant in Heckman) and the 
common language dummy variable (whose effect changes from statistically insignificant in HMR to positive 
and statistically significant in Heckman). 
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deliver biased estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity because of the logarithmical 
linearization of the gravity equation. 
 Column 4 and 5 of Table 4 present the results from the PPML model and the 
Truncated PPML model respectively. As shown in column 4 of Table 4, the trade effects of 
some variables in the PPML model turn out counter-intuitive. For example, the impact of 
common religion or common language is estimated to be negative and statistically 
significant, but belonging to an island somehow promotes trade in a statistical significant 
way. A glance at the column 5 of Table 4 reveals that moving to the Truncated PPML model 
alleviates some but not all the puzzles. Such unexpected results delivered by the PPML and 
Truncated PPML models cast doubt on their underlying assumptions. In other words, the 
issue of non-random sample selection should not be ignored for the current study. 
We now turn to the TS-NLS model. The first-step Probit estimation is summarized in 
second last column of Table 4. All trade determinants carry the expected signs and are 
statistically significant except for the colonial tie dummy variable. The second-step 
Nonlinear Least Square estimation is presented in the last column of Table 4.  Three features 
are worth noting here. First, the Inverse Mill’s Ratio is highly significant, pointing to the 
importance of correcting for the sample selection bias. Second, the common religion variable 
turns out adversely affecting the amount of trade between actively trading countries. Later we 
will show that this negative effect on the intensive margin is more than offset one the impact 
on the extensive margin is taken into account. Thirdly, the positive effects of common 
currency and regional trade agreements do not stand out statistically significant in the second 
stage, suggesting that both factors may play a more important role in facilitating the creation 
of new trade partnership, than in increasing the pre-existing trade volumes. 
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To put the econometric results in Table 4 into a richer economic context, we compute 
the marginal effects in each model and present them in Table 5. It is clear from Table 5 that 
different methods of estimation yield different marginal effects, either on the intensive 
margin or on the extensive margin, which echoes Linders and Groot (2011). We mainly 
discuss the marginal effects generated from the TS-NLS model. A longer distance reduces 
both the propensity to trade and the volume of trade, with an overall elasticity of -1.48(=-
1.04-0.68+0.24).53 The net effect of the similarity of religion is positive (0.47-
0.44+0.15=0.18), although it affects the two margins in opposite directions. A plausible 
explanation is that new entrants to the world market (corresponding to the positive effect on 
the extensive margin) tend to “steal business” from the incumbent exporters (leading to a 
negative effect on the intensive margin). A shared country border, a historical colonial 
relationship, a common official language, or a shared legal system facilitates trade as 
expected. Being isolated in an island or having no coastal lines constrains trade, which is in 
line with our presumptions. 
Table 5: Marginal effects of Heckman, E.T.-Tobit, and TS-NLS modelsa 
Heckmanb E.T.-Tobit TS-NLS 
Intensivec 
 
intensive extensive intensive extensive 
direct indirect 
ijdist  -1.11 
(0.03) 
-1.38 
(0.05) 
-2.93 
(0.07) 
-1.04 
(0.05) 
-0.68 
(0.05) 
0.24 
(0.03) 
ijreligion  n.a. 0.39 
(0.09) 
0.83 
(0.17) 
0.47 
(0.07) 
-0.44 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(0.02) 
ijborder  0.50 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
0.04 
(0.35) 
0.38 
(0.12) 
0.62 
(0.11) 
-0.22 
(0.03) 
ijisland  -0.37 
(0.11) 
-0.62 
(0.12) 
-1.33 
(0.21) 
-0.54 
(0.10) 
0.33 
(0.21) 
-0.12 
(0.02) 
ijlandlock
 
-0.54 
(0.16) 
-0.55 
(0.18) 
-1.18 
(0.32) 
-0.29 
(0.12) 
-0.69 
(0.23) 
0.24 
(0.03) 
 
                                                 
53 The magnitude is within the range reported by Disdier and Head (2008). 
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Table 5. (continued) 
Heckmanb E.T.-Tobit TS-NLS 
Intensivec 
 
intensive extensive intensive extensive 
direct indirect 
ijcolony  1.26 
(0.13) 
1.33 
(0.15) 
2.82 
(0.27) 
0.36 
(0.33) 
0.32 
(0.14) 
-0.11 
(0.02) 
ijlanguage
 
0.18 
(0.05) 
0.48 
(0.06) 
1.03 
(0.11) 
0.40 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
ijcu  1.32 
(0.21) 
1.35 
(0.27) 
2.88 
(0.50) 
0.98 
(0.15) 
0.94 
(0.60) 
-0.33 
(0.05) 
ijlegal  0.48 
(0.04) 
0.37 
(0.05) 
0.80 
(0.09) 
0.08 
(0.04) 
0.29 
(0.07) 
-0.10 
(0.01) 
ijFTA  0.44 
(0.16) 
0.69 
(0.25) 
1.46 
(0.47) 
2.51 
(0.32) 
0.12 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
Note: a. The marginal effects of the PPML are omitted because they are identical to the corresponding raw 
coefficients reported in column 4 and 5 of Table 4. b. The extensive margins from the Heckman model is 
omitted because they are identical to the extensive margins from the TS-NLS model. c. The intensive margin 
is further decomposed into two parts: the direct effect corresponds to the raw coefficients in the second stage; 
the indirect effect is through the sample selection correcting term. 
 
Interestingly, the adoption of the same currency or the engagement in a regional trade 
agreement is found to foster bilateral trade, but such trade-promoting effect is only 
significant through the extensive margin. In other words, both factors are more likely to 
improve market access and induce more countries to start trading, than to expand the size of 
trade between countries that have been trading all along. The mild effect of FTAs on the 
intensive margin to trade has been found in previous studies as well. Specifically, Rose 
(2004) reported that the GATT/WTO membership (which can be seen as a broadly defined 
multilateral FTA) does not play a strong role in expanding the amount of trade. Felbermayr 
and Kohler (2007) argued that the WTO membership promotes international trade primarily 
via the extensive margin.54 The literature also provides several studies in support of the 
limited positive effect of the currency union on the intensive margin to trade. In particular, 
                                                 
54 However, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) argue that the trade effect of FTAs is under-estimated due to the 
endogeneity problem. 
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Rose and van Wincoop (2001) show that the trade-promoting effect of monetary union is 
generally over-estimated. Using a dataset exclusive of zero trade records, Baldwin and 
Taglioni (2006) report that the impact of currency union on international trade is trivial. 
Diagnostic Analysis 
As shown in Section 3, the TS-NLS estimator outperforms the alternative estimators in a 
gravity equation analysis because it satisfactorily deals with heteroskedasticity and addresses 
the sample selection bias. In this subsection, we propose a model selection strategy for the 
empirical application and evaluate the suitability of each estimator. 
We select the appropriate model based on two criteria. The first consideration is the 
correct specification of the regression equation. If the regression equation is mis-specified, 
the corresponding estimates are inconsistent. We use the Reset specification test (Ramsey, 
1969) as a diagnostic tool for this purpose. Intuitively, the test is implemented by fitting the 
regression equation with one additional regressor that is the square of the linear prediction 
generated from the original specification. The null hypothesis that the original specification 
is correctly specified is rejected if the additional regressor turns out statistically significant. 
Table 6 summarizes the test results for all estimators. The Heckman model and the E.T.-
Tobit model are found to be mis-specified, which confirms that the practice of logarithmic 
transformation is inappropriate. In contrast, the PPML model (or its truncated version) and 
the TS-NLS model, both expressing trade flows in levels, survive the specification test.55 Our 
second model selection criterion is to compare the predicted with the observed trade flows.56 
                                                 
55 We also conduct the Reset test for the first-stage Probit of the TS-NLS model and find weak evidence of mis-
specification: the null hypothesis is rejected at 10% and 5% level, but accepted at 1% level.   
56 In the Heckman and the TS-NLS models, trade is predicted to be zero if the associated fitted probability of 
trading is less than 0.5. 
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To examine the accuracy of prediction of each estimator, we compute the correlation 
between the predicted and observed outcomes and report them in the bottom half of Table 6. 
As shown in the table, the PPML, the Truncated PPML, and the TS-NLS models predict 
trade flows reasonably well, with the correlations above 0.9. As expected, the prediction 
from the Heckman model or the E.T.-Tobit model is much less accurate. Therefore, given the 
specification test results and the correlation analysis, we consider the Heckman model and 
the E.T.-Tobit model strongly dominated, and the Truncated PPML weakly dominated (by 
the TS-NLS model). 
Table 6: Specification test and correlation of observed and predicted trade 
Heckman E.T.-Tobit PPML PPML>0 TS-NLS P value of the 
Reset testa 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.65 0.45 
 
Heckman E.T.-Tobit PPML PPML>0 TS-NLS Correlation 
with observed 
trade 
 
0.594 
 
0.600 
 
0.939 
 
0.936 
 
0.942 
Note: a. Reset test is conducted as follows: (i) re-estimate the model with an auxiliary variable, which is the 
square of the linear prediction from the original specification; (ii) test if the auxiliary variable is statistically 
different from zero; (iii) the original specification is mis-specified if the null hypothesis in (ii) is rejected.  
 
Now that the model selection boils down to the comparison between the PPML model 
and the TS-NLS model, we push our second criterion further by regressing the predicted 
trade series on the actually observed trade series. In Figure 1, we depict the two fitted lines 
and compare them with the 45 degree diagonal (corresponding to perfect prediction). It is 
clear from Figure 1 that the fitted line associated with the TS-NLS model is closer to the 45 
degree diagonal than the fitted line associated with the PPML model. Therefore, we conclude 
from our model selection strategy that the TS-NLS model is the most preferred model for this 
particular empirical study. 
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Figure 1. Predicted trade and observed trade 
 
Conclusion 
A vexing issue in the gravity equation model to trade is how to statistically estimate the 
model when two stylized features are present in trade data: numerous zero trade records and 
heteroskedasticity. In this paper, we answer the question by proposing a Two-Step Nonlinear 
Least Square (TS-NLS) estimator. The novel estimator works as follows. In the first step, the 
estimator characterizes the binary decision to trade and shed light on the extensive margins to 
trade. In the second step, positive trade flows are estimated in levels via a weighted nonlinear 
least square procedure, with the potential sample selection bias taken into account. 
Consequently, the estimator yields consistent estimates for the structural parameters in a 
gravity equation and identifies the extensive margin of trade from the intensive margins of 
trade. In a set of Monte-Carlo experiments, we show that the TS-NLS estimator strictly 
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dominates the PPML model, the Heckman model, and the E.T.-Tobit model, and that it 
weakly outperforms the Truncated PPML model. In an analysis of world trade and its 
determinants in 1986, we further illustrate the usefulness of the TS-NLS model. We find that 
the adoption of the same currency and the participation in a regional trade agreement 
facilitate trade primarily via improving market access for previous non-traders, rather than 
expanding the size of existing trade between active traders.  
Several extensions can be attempted to fully utilize the proposed TS-NLS estimator. 
For example, it is desirable to relax the joint normality assumption and address the issue of 
non-random sample selection in a more general way. It is also interesting to apply the TS-
NSL model to other constant-elasticity economic models. For example, one may expect 
certain degree of heteroskedasticity in wages or earnings data. Therefore, it is worthwhile to 
estimate the Mincer log earnings model (Mincer, 1974) via the TS-NLS procedure and 
investigate to what extent the logarithmic transformation biases the results. 
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Appendix 
Table A. Simulation results under six scenarios when 1 1γ = −  
 
 
 
 
 
estimator 
 
x 
Few zeros
(20%) 
Many zeros 
(50%) 
  Bias ˆ 1β −  Var. ˆvar( )β  Mean Square 
Error 
 
 Bias ˆ 1β −  Var. ˆvar( )β  Mean Square 
Error 
 
Homoskedasticity: the variance is a constant 
1 -0.318 0.037 0.138 -0.789 0.148 0.770 PPML 
2 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.005 0.005 
1 0.018 0.002 0.002 0.019 0.007 0.007 T-PPML 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 0.165 3.130 3.157 0.315 13.93 14.03 Heckman 
2 0.029 1.474 1.475 -0.061 15.11 15.11 
1 -0.622 0.994 1.381 -0.954 1.620 2.530 Tobit 
2 -0.696 0.065 0.550 -0.814 0.032 0.695 
1 0.014 0.002 0.002 0.021 0.002 0.003 TS-NLS 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Heteroskedasticity: the variance is proportional to the mean 
1 -0.346 0.040 0.160 -0.802 0.155 0.798 PPML 
2 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 
1 0.016 0.003 0.004 0.013 0.019 0.019 T-PPML 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 0.053 3.216 3.219 0.035 17.10 17.10 Heckman 
2 -0.032 1.855 1.856 0.163 12.71 12.74 
1 -0.463 1.112 1.326 -0.888 1.141 1.930 Tobit 
2 -0.626 0.079 0.471 -0.833 0.024 0.718 
1 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.018 0.005 0.006 TS-NLS 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Super-Heteroskedasticity: the variance is proportional to the squared mean 
1 -0.346 0.041 0.160 -0.795 0.168 0.800 PPML 
2 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005 
1 0.017 0.006 0.006 0.013 0.018 0.018 T-PPML 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 -0.029 3.251 3.251 0.179 24.48 24.51 Heckman 
2 -0.039 1.585 1.587 0.005 1.001 1.002 
1 -0.544 0.837 1.133 -0.840 1.409 2.115 Tobit 
2 -0.637 0.083 0.488 -0.815 0.028 0.692 
1 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.016 0.008 0.008 TS-NLS 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
